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ABSTRACT
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF EDUCATIONAL CAPITAL
IN POLICING
BY
THADDEUS LATEEF JOHNSON
AUGUST 2020
Committee Chair: Dr. Eric Sevigny
Major Department: Criminal Justice and Criminology
This dissertation consists of three papers examining whether and to what degree
educational capital (e.g., college-educated officers and education policy) in law enforcement
influence police-citizen violence, misconduct, and crime.
Paper 1 examines the effects of officer education on police-citizen violence. Using the
Police Stress and Domestic Violence in Police Families in Baltimore, Maryland data, we employ a
doubly robust propensity score design to compare outcomes among 1,104 Baltimore city police
officers. We also apply multiple imputation to address missing data and include measures
capturing officer work attitudes and stress levels. We find that having a bachelor’s degree is
associated with a lower probability of an on-duty shooting relative to the counterfactual
condition of high school education only. Results also indicate that college-educated officers are
just as likely as non-college educated officers to make violent arrests and encounter physical
altercations.
Paper 2 analyzes the relationship between the proportion of bachelor-degreed
officers in agencies and misconduct complaints. Using a national sample of 1,023 U.S. law
enforcement agencies from the Police Use of Force: Official Reports, Citizen Complaints, and

Legal Consequences Project data, this study employs design-based analysis and multiple
imputation of missing data with a doubly robust propensity score model applied to a
multivalued treatment. We observed that large city departments in the medium and high
education categories generated more abuse of authority and overall misconduct complaints
than departments with low education levels.
Chapter 3 examines the mediating effects of arrests on the departmental education
requirements and crime association. We integrate entropy balance weighting procedures with a
novel mediation approach to identify the direct and indirect effects of agency education policy
on crime in 1,543 U.S. cities using multiple data sources: Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey
(ACS), and FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). We find that police arrest productivity does not
significantly mediate the impact of education policy on crime outcomes; however, significant
total effects were detected. For violent crime, college requirements were associated with
significant reductions in aggravated assaults. For property crime, cities adopting a college
requirement for police experienced fewer burglaries.
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Introduction
Treat education as an investment in man… treat its consequences as a form of capital. Since
education becomes a part of the person receiving it, I shall refer to it as human capital. 1
Communities expect the police to provide safety and security without infringing upon
their civil liberties. Unfortunately, this is not always the case given the legacy of questionable
police practices in the US. Most salient of these are unjustifiable police shootings, misconduct,
and police brutality. Periods of protest and calls for police reform often follow high-profile
police-citizen encounters. Most recently, the viral images of George Floyd pleading to
Minneapolis officers, “I can’t breathe,” along with a spate of highly publicized police shootings
of unarmed Black Americans (e.g., Breonna Taylor and Rayshard Brooks), have inspired
widespread demands for an overhaul of U.S. law enforcement.
While many recommendations abound about the best path toward police reform,
including defunding the police and national use of force standards, one has remained constant
over the past century—increase the educational requirements for police. Beginning with August
Vollmer in the early 1900s, leading authorities have maintained that hiring more collegeeducated officers is imperative to improving the quality of police services. This assumption rests
on the commonsense notion that formally educated officers are more politically and socially
astute, knowledgeable of human behavior, cosmopolitan in their values, self-disciplined, and
altruistic (Telep, 2011). In this way, college-educated officers would appear to be ideal
candidates for democratic policing.

1

Excerpt from Capital Formation by Education (Schultz, 1961, p. 1).
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The nation’s police forces responded to these calls for professionalization. In 1974, just
five percent of jurisdictions had a college education requirement (National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978). Today, roughly a third of departments have such a
standard (Reaves, 2015). In line with broader U.S. educational attainment trends (Baro and
Burlingame, 1999; U.S. Department of Education, 2018), the number of police officers who
have attended college has risen three-fold since 1960 (Gardiner, 2015; National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978).
Despite these positive trends and grand promises, higher education’s practical benefit
remains unclear, especially as it concerns the profession’s core aspects—the use of force,
ethical conduct, and crime control. The research findings on educational attainment’s influence
on these outcomes are decidedly mixed, owing largely to enduring methodological and
theoretical shortcomings. Lamenting these limitations, the National Academies Panel on Police
Policy and Performance (NAP) called attention to poor methodologies, inadequate samples,
and the absence of theoretically informed variables in prior research (Skogan and Frydl, 2004).
Despite these critiques, three major limitations continue to plague this collection of
scholarship. First, the research tends to be atheoretical, which leaves us without a clear
framework for predicting and explaining the impacts of education on policing outcomes.
Second, the evidence-base hinges primarily on correlational methods that do not adequately
account for the endogeneity concerns, notably unequal selection into higher education. The
third limitation concerns the lack of empirical attention to potential causal mechanisms through
which education influences police performance.
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The noted limitations and mixed findings of the literature serve as the impetus for this
dissertation. Identifying how educational attainment affects the delivery of police services takes
on added urgency in the current period of unrest and social change. Drawing on various data
sources and methodological strategies, I present three papers that attempt to fill substantial
gaps in the policing literature. These papers explore higher education’s influence across time,
place, and units of analysis (individual-, departmental-, and city-level). Specifically, I examine
whether and to what degree educational capital (e.g., college-educated officers) and capital
policy (e.g., educational standards) in law enforcement are associated with police-citizen
violence, misconduct, excessive force, and crime control.
The first paper examines the link between officer education and the probability of being
involved in a physical altercation, violent arrest, and on-duty shooting using a sample of 1,104
sworn officers from the Police Stress and Domestic Violence in Police Families in Baltimore,
Maryland data collected between 1997 and 1999 (Gershon, 1999). The second paper
investigates the association between a department’s educational profile (i.e., percent of
bachelor-degreed officers) and complaints of police misconduct among a nationally
representative sample of police departments (N = 1,023) from the Police Use of Force: Official
Reports, Citizen Complaints, and Legal Consequences data gathered from 1991 to 1992 (Pate
and Fridell, 1993). In the last paper, we integrate entropy reweighting and mediation
approaches to examine the effect of agency education policy on crime rates in 1,543 U.S. cities
and whether this effect operates through enhanced arrest deterrence. The data for this third
paper is drawn from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS)
survey, the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), and the FBI’s Uniform
13

Crime Reports (UCR). Together these three papers offer fresh insights into the complex role of
higher education and its consequences for public safety.
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Before presenting the individual papers, I first
provide a brief historical account of police education reform. After presenting the papers, I
close with a recap of the dissertation’s central goals, motivations, and implications for research
and policy.
A Genealogy of Police Education Reform
For nearly 100 years, higher education requirements for officers have been widely
viewed as the bedrock of police reform. August Vollmer, “the father of modern law
enforcement,” first called for better-educated officers during policing’s political era (Brunson
and Wright, 2016). This was indeed innovative, if not radical thinking, given that most officers
had not graduated from high school at that time (Fogelson, 1977; Vollmer, 1931). Despite some
local success in California, Vollmer’s work did not garner national attention until his 1929
appointment to the Wickersham Commission (Vollmer, 1931; Walker, 1977). This early
Commission held that college-educated officers would be better prepared for the everexpanding complexities of modern policing (National Advisory Commission on Higher Education
for Police Officers, 1978). Like many subsequent calls, however, this suggestion was based on
conventional wisdom rather than conclusive scientific evidence.
While the appointment of the Wickersham Commission marked the dawn of a new era
in policing, enhancing American law enforcement’s education profile was not cast as a criminal
justice priority until 30 years later (Walker, 1977). Prompted by soaring crime rates and
widespread social unrest of the 1960s—largely due to the confluence of controversial policing
14

strategies, political turmoil, and widespread racial injustices (Fisher-Stewart, 2007; Jacobs and
Magdovitz, 1977)—the government acted on this front. In response, President Lyndon B.
Johnson convened the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice in 1967. Tasked with authoring best-practice recommendations for the justice system,
the Johnson Commission published the landmark report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society. Among many other suggestions, the report proposed that “the ultimate aim of all
police departments should be that all personnel with general enforcement powers have
baccalaureate degrees” (p. 109).
Despite the lack of sound evidence for this proposition, scholars, civic leaders, and
government officials continued to endorse a bachelor’s degree as an indispensable
employment qualification for police personnel (see, e.g., American Bar Association, 1974;
Kerner Commission, 1968; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards Goals,
1973; National Commission on the Causes Prevention of Violence, 1969; National Advisory
Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers, 1978). On the heels of the 1967
Commission report, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was established
with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. This initiative set
in motion a precipitous expansion in federal spending on law enforcement with almost one
billion dollars allocated under LEAA, including immense investments in police education
through the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) (Blomberg et al., 2013; Roberg and
Bonn, 2004). As one of LEAA’s signature programs, LEEP executives doled out substantial funds
to grow undergraduate policing curricular at colleges and universities and incentivized college
enrollment among working officers through grants and loans (Shernock, 1992).
15

Five years later, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards Goals
(1973) reinforced the Johnson Commission’s proposal on police education standards, noting
that “twenty years ago the high school diplomas were a significant educational achievement; it
is not today. To continue recruiting at this level of education is to invite mediocrity” (p. 327).
That same year, the American Bar Association’s Advisory Committee on urban policing
proclaimed that college-educated officers are more progressive, knowledgeable of human
behavior, self-disciplined, and altruistic (Telep, 2011).
In 1978, the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers
nuanced the discourse around police education minimums. Instead of “educating the
recruited,” they urged departments to focus on “recruiting the educated” in their report, “The
Quality of Police Education.” This strategic shift was largely premised on the belief that officers
who begin college after police training academy would “already have developed a set of
occupational attitudes as well as a set of operational styles” (Worden, 1990, p. 568), potentially
rivaling the expected benefits of higher education.
LEEP’s funding eventually ended two years later in 1980 (Eskridge, 1989). Though shortlived, officers apparently took early advantage of these educational incentives. Nationally, the
proportion of degreed officers climbed from three percent in 1960, to about nine percent just
14 years later (Carter and Sapp, 1990).
As law enforcement philosophies began to pivot toward community engagement in the
1980s (Paoline et al., 2000; Wilson and Kelling, 1982), officers with college credentials became a
valued human resource (Carter and Sapp, 1990). As urban crime rates spiked in the early 1990s,
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act in 1994—the most
16

massive anti-crime bill in U.S. history (Zhao et al., 2003). Though known mostly for its harsh
sentencing provisions (e.g., three strikes mandates), this Clinton-era bill was also intended to
curb violent crime by increasing the number of college-educated police officers serving our
communities. Under its provisions, $200 million was authorized for college scholarships for inservice law enforcement officers and students agreeing to join the police force through Police
Corps.
Insomuch as the 1994 Crime Act, along with a host of other factors (e.g., a booming
economy and shrinking crack-cocaine market), has been credited with driving down violent
crime rates in the 2000s (Marvell and Moody, 1996; Zhao et al., 2003; Zimring, 2017), it did
little to repair the strained police-citizen relationship. Following a rash of deadly police
shootings of unarmed black men, the Obama Administration assembled the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing in 2015. Once again, the federal government positioned higher
education for officers as central to the fair exercise of police authority. Representing a
prominent focus of the 2015 Task Force (the fifth “pillar” of policing), they suggested that “the
federal government, as well as state and local agencies, should encourage and incentivize
higher education for law enforcement officers” (p. 51). Among other objectives, the Task Force
sought to build public trust and improve police effectiveness by placing more collegecredentialed officers on the streets.2

2

No presidential commission appointments have occurred since 2015. Considering this, along with President

Trump’s call for more aggressive policing of urban areas, it is unclear whether increasing the number of collegeeducated officers in the US remains a top cabinet-level priority (Graham, 2019).
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Such a commitment over the years naturally begs the question: What difference have
these investments made in augmenting the education profile of American law enforcement?
The financial incentives, combined with the ongoing push for a better-educated police force,
clearly delivered desired returns. Even though departments have been slow to heed the advice
of the various national panels, officers with a college background are now the norm. In
comparison to 1960 when only three percent of police officers held a bachelor’s degree, the
current figure is about 11 times that amount (Reaves, 2015). Estimates also reveal that over
half of all law enforcement personnel in the US have completed some college coursework
(Gardiner, 2017).
At first glance, one might think that the cited government programs and policy
initiatives are behind this growth. However, experts credit the rising number of collegeeducated officers to a parallel uptrend in educational attainment among the general population
(Baro and Burlingame, 1999; Hawley, 1998; Travis, 1995). Most departments, primarily due to
the lack of hard evidence, have yet to fully impose stricter education policies (i.e., less than one
percent of agencies require a bachelor’s degree, nearly 10% require an associate’s degree, and
just over 15% require some college credit; Reaves, 2015). The lack of congruence between
American police officers' educational credentials and departmental education requirements
indicates the need for more research in this area. In what follows, we assess the public safety
value of educational capital building in policing and whether hiring college-educated officers
produces more effective and ethical police forces

18

1 The College Shield: Examining the Role of Officer Education in Violent Police Encounters
Introduction
There is a long history of police-citizen violence in the United States. Recent and highly
publicized media accounts of excessive use of police force, especially lethal force, have fueled
public outrage and eroded police legitimacy (Maguire et al., 2017). As a consequence, police
officers are themselves facing increasing levels of hostility and violence (Kaminski and Stucky,
2009; Mac Donald, 2016). Considering this, few public safety topics warrant more attention
today than preventing police-citizen violence.
For much of the last half century, identifying ways to foster comity between law
enforcement and the public by reducing violent encounters represents an enduring theme of
criminal justice reform (Klinger, 2007). Among other initiatives such as officer training and
civilian oversight, improving officer diversity and credentials continue to figure centrally in this
discourse. Beyond recruiting more female and minority candidates, stakeholders have long
encouraged hiring officers with a college degree as a way to improve police-citizen relations
(e.g., see National Research Council, 2004; President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice, 1967; President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015;
Sherman and the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers, 1978).
Observers cast college-educated officers as better problem solvers, more culturally
informed, and more humanistic and, therefore, less likely to be involved in violent
confrontations (Carter et al., 1989). Police reformers argue that college-educated officers are
more progressive and possess desirable skills, traits, and experiences that are difficult to
acquire on the job or in training (Blumberg and Niederhoffer, 1985; Breci, 1994; Carter and
19

Sapp, 1990; Smith and Aamodt, 1997; Telep, 2011; Varricchio, 1998). Moreover, educated
officers appear suited for contemporary law enforcement approaches that emphasize
community building over aggressive policing (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
2015).
The claim that better-educated officers are more adept at de-escalation techniques and
better at defusing potentially violent situations makes sense on its face. However, the available
evidence-base on this question is mixed (Chapman, 2012; Kaminski and Sorensen, 1995; Lim
and Lee, 2015; Paoline and Terrill, 2007; Ridgeway, 2016; Sherman and Blumberg, 1981; Terrill
and Mastrofski, 2002; van Reemst et al., 2015; Willits and Nowacki, 2014; Worrall et al., 2018).
For example, whereas Ridgeway’s (2016) analysis of New York City officers demonstrates that
education level is not predictive of police shootings, McElvain and Kposowa’s (2008) study set
in Riverside, California shows that college-educated officers are less likely to use their firearms
than non-college officers in similar situations. Possible explanations for these inconsistencies
range from variability in research designs, measurement, and samples to omitted variable bias.
Thus, we need additional research to understand whether and to what extent officer education
affects the likelihood of violent police-citizen encounters.
We improve upon prior research in at least three ways. First, we control for key
measures capturing work attitudes and experiences not previously considered, such as job
satisfaction and burnout, that could explain differences in outcomes between college and noncollege educated officers. For example, while scholars note that burnout threatens the quality
of job performance (Euwema et al., 2004; Kop and Euwema, 2001), no other study on officer
education and police-citizen violence accounts for this factor. Another limitation concerns the
20

use of correlational designs in prior research, leaving results open to selection bias and
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, we further contribute to the literature by employing a doubly
robust propensity score approach to enhance the comparability of officers by educational
status, and thereby mitigate some of the causal inference challenges of standard regression
approaches typically used by researchers (Linden et al., 2016; Rubin, 2001). Finally, in contrast
to previous studies in this area, we employ multiple imputation to prevent the loss of statistical
power and biased parameter estimates due to missing data (Graham, 2009).
Before specifying our hypotheses, we first review the literature, discuss the
methodological limitations of prior research examining the association between officer
education and police-citizen violence, and detail how the current study addresses these
shortcomings. We then describe the data and sample, measures, and analytic plan. After
presenting the results, we conclude with a discussion of the implications for policy and practice.
Prior Research
Educational Attainment and Violent Police Encounters
Scholars have shed considerable light on the situational, environmental, and
departmental factors influencing police-citizen violence (e.g., Shjarback and White, 2016; White
and Klinger, 2012). Less well understood is the degree to which officer characteristics, namely
education level, affect an officer’s risk of confronting and using violence on the job. This is a
critical gap, as police and municipal leaders have direct control over setting officer
qualifications that may help reduce violent police encounters, including police shootings.
Therefore, a deeper understanding of the link between an officer’s level of education and
police-citizen violence can help develop recruitment strategies and operational policies that
21

mitigate these risks. In this section, we review the literature exploring the influence of
educational attainment on violent police encounters, including the general use of force, police
shootings, and physical altercations.
Higher Education and Use of Force
Findings on the role of officer education level in police use of force encounters are
mixed. Despite a few significant results, null findings have been found consistently across
geographic regions, periods, and agency settings (e.g., urban/rural) (Brandl et al., 2001; Fridell
and Lim, 2016; Klahm, Frank, and Brown, 2011; Morabito and Doerner, 1997; Sun and Payne,
2004; Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Small to large effect sizes, however, observed in several studies
demonstrate that college-educated officers are less likely to resort to physical force than their
non-college educated peers (Chapman, 2012; Paoline and Terrill, 2007; Rydberg and Terrill,
2010; Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002). For instance, Terrill and colleagues published a series of
papers between 2002 and 2010 drawing on the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN) data,
which examined policing practices in Indianapolis, IN and St. Petersburg, FL during 1996 and
1997. Using identical samples, comparable modeling strategies, and high school education level
as the reference category, the likelihood of college-educated officers threatening or inflicting
physical force during citizen interactions was 4% to 50% lower across the studies. We speculate
that the varying estimates reflect differences in variable selection and methodological nuances
(e.g., interaction terms). Of further note, the findings may not be broadly generalizable since
these studies draw from the same data.
In another study, Chapman (2012) analyzed police data from three predominately nonwhite cities in New Jersey in 2008, where he found that college education shares a significant
22

inverse relationship with both the use of force and level of force. Interestingly, the strength of
this association among patrol officers drives the overall finding as education level had no
statistically meaningful effects among detectives and other officers. Chapman’s analysis,
however, only controls for officer age, experience, and race, making it unclear whether
controlling for the other relevant factors such as gender and duty assignment would render this
relationship non-significant.
Higher Education and Police Shootings
With a few exceptions, the balance of the research on police use of lethal force,
including police shootings, suggests higher education is statistically inconsequential across
various contexts (Ridgeway, 2016; Sherman and Blumberg, 1981; Smith, 2004; Willits and
Nowacki, 2014; Worrall et al., 2018). For example, drawing on NYPD Firearm Discharge Review
Board data from 2004 to 2006, Ridgeway’s (2016) matched case-control analysis revealed that
officer education level did not significantly determine police shootings. Nonetheless, at least
two studies find that college-educated officers are less inclined to use deadly force (Donner et
al., 2017; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008). In a study covering the 15 years between 1990 and
2004, for instance, McElvain and Kposowa (2008) reported that college-educated officers from
a Southern California agency were about 30% less likely than those without college experience
to shoot a citizen. Similarly, Donner and colleagues’ (2017) National Institute of Justicesponsored study based on 2004 Philadelphia Police Department data identified a statistically
significant association, wherein each completed year of post-secondary education corresponds
with a 22% drop in the risk for officer-involved shootings.
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Higher Education and Physical Altercations Against Police
The literature provides limited insights into how officer characteristics are associated
with the likelihood of being a target of violence (Pinizzotto and Davis, 1995; Fridell and Pate,
2001; Greenan, 1987; Geller, 1982; Kavanagh, 1997), with only a handful of studies focusing
specifically on education effects. One set of studies suggests that officer education has no
bearing on suspect resistance and physical aggression directed toward police (Engel, 2003;
Kavanagh, 1997; van Reemst et al., 2015). Other research detects a positive association
between educational attainment and police assaults (Hale and Wilson, 1974). Lastly, another
group of studies documents an inverse association between college education and police
assaults, personal injuries, and suspect resistance (Cascio, 1977; Kaminski and Sorensen, 1995).
In Cascio’s (1977) study of Florida officers, for instance, college-educated officers suffered
fewer injuries from altercations than their less educated coworkers. Nearly 20 years later,
Kaminski and Sorensen’s (1995) analysis showed that Baltimore County Police officers with a
bachelor’s degree were half as likely to be assaulted than less educated officers.
Limitations of Prior Research
There are some key sources of uncertainty in this literature. First, scholarship cutting
across several disciplines indicates that the effects of higher education on policing are complex,
with education potentially serving as a proxy for other underlying factors. For instance, aside
from having relatively higher levels of moral maturity and critical reasoning (Pascarella and
Terenzini, 2005), college-educated officers might be distinct from less educated officers in their
attitudes and behavioral expressions. Police research shows that education is positively
associated with job cynicism (Telep, 2011), ambition (Gau et al., 2013; Johnson, 2011),
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perceived self-efficacy (Kakar, 1998, 2003), policy compliance (Cunningham, 2006), and
careerist attitudes (Paoline et al., 2000). These attributes are strong determinants of work
productivity in law enforcement settings.
Why is this important? In law enforcement, production is measured by arrests, citations,
seized contraband, calls for police service, average response times, and so on. As is true of any
other enterprising worker, officers must perform at high levels to compete for better pay,
shifts, and career opportunities (Buckley et al., 1993). They are also fully aware that
commanders use these traditional metrics to track performance, with implications for future
promotion considerations. Scholars note that the attainment of a college degree often
underpins an officer’s desire for raises, upward mobility, or more prestigious assignments
(Buckley et al., 1993; Gau et al., 2013; Hayeslip, 1989). Therefore, college-educated officers
might be especially zealous in their pursuit of advancement, fostering a more energetic
enforcement style that results in higher rates of stops, citations, seizures, and arrests.
Importantly, these decision points precede many police confrontations involving physical force
(Bonkiewicz, 2015; Brandl et al., 2001; Wilson and Zhao, 2008), with more serious altercations
usually occurring during proactive officer contacts (Pinizzotto, 1997; Rydberg and Terrill, 2010;
Terrill and Ingram, 2016). Despite the potential contribution of work attitudes in police-citizen
interactions, previous studies rarely control for such measures, omitting potentially important
factors in the relationship between educational attainment and violent police encounters.
The second major limitation is methodological in nature. Apart from omitted variable
bias, previous studies examining the effects of educational attainment on police-citizen
violence suffer from self-selection issues, given the combination of observational data,
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correlational methods, and previously uncontrolled factors. To our knowledge, only one other
study in this area attempted to overcome the threat of selection bias (Ridgway, 2016).
However, educational attainment functioned as a control in Ridgeway’s matched case-control
analysis, and theoretically important work attitudes and experiences including job satisfaction
and burnout were not considered.
The Current Study
Using officer-level data from the Police Stress and Domestic Violence in Police Families in
Baltimore, Maryland study collected between 1997 and 1999 (Gershon, 1999), we perform a
doubly robust propensity score analysis within a multiple imputation framework to investigate
the effects of higher education on violent encounters between police and citizens. The present
study advances prior research in several ways. First, we control for work attitudes and
characteristics that may confound the association between officer education and violent
encounters with the public, which few studies have previously done. In this way, we also bridge
studies on college-educated officers’ work attitudes and use of force behavior. Second, most
findings in this area are derived from correlational studies, making them vulnerable to selection
bias and other endogeneity concerns. To handle selection bias issues, we apply a doubly robust
propensity score weighting design to evaluate the consequences of different levels of
educational attainment for police-citizen outcomes. Our implementation captures the
multivalued effects of a college education net of officer characteristics, work attitudes, and onthe-job experiences, as it incorporates a weighting scheme to balance cases on the treatment
and regression adjustment on the outcome to reduce the bias in the estimated treatment
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effect. Lastly, in contrast to prior studies, we employ multiple imputation to address missing
data in a rigorous manner.
Despite the mixed findings on the impacts of education, we draw some key insights
from the most recent research indicating that formal education lowers an officer’s likelihood of
both using force (see e.g., Donner et al., 2017; Lim et al., 2014; Rydberg and Terrill, 2010;
Stickle, 2016) and citizen altercations (Shjarback and White, 2016). Further, researchers also
note that a college education develops an officer’s ability to handle complex tasks and process
information, making for greater professionalism and restraint in potentially violent situations
(Telep, 2011). We therefore expect that in spite of their well-documented productivity, collegeeducated officers will be at lower risk for involvement in police shootings, violent arrests, and
physical altercations compared to those with a lesser education.
Methods
Data and Measures
Data from the Police Stress and Domestic Violence in Police Families in Baltimore,
Maryland study were collected as part of a collaborative effort between the Baltimore Police
Department, Baltimore’s Fraternal Order of Police, and researchers from the Johns Hopkins’
School of Public Health (Gershon, 1999). Surveys were distributed to 1,150 of the
approximately 2,500 Baltimore Police Department officers attending roll call at the various
precincts and headquarters. Of the selected officers, 1,104 (93.2%) who completed the
questionnaire were included in our sample.3 The original goal of the survey was to document
the amount of stress among police officers and ascertain whether that stress led to adverse

3

We were unable to locate details on why the remaining officers did not complete the survey.

27

behaviors, including personal and occupational violence (for complete details see Gershon,
1999).
Dependent Variables
We analyze three outcomes in this study: police shooting, violent arrest, and citizen
altercation. We operationalized the measure of police shooting from the following survey item:
“If you have ever experienced shooting someone, please indicate how much it emotionally
affected you,” with response options ‘Not at all,’ ‘A little,’ ‘Very much,’ and ‘Not applicable’. To
signify whether an officer had ever shot someone while on duty, respondents answering ‘not
applicable’ were assigned a value of 0 and the remaining respondents were assigned a value of
1. Using the same operationalization scheme, the second outcome, violent arrest, is based on
the survey item: “If you have ever experienced making a violent arrest, please indicate how
much it emotionally affected you,” with response options ‘Not at all,’ ‘A little,’ ‘Very much,’ and
‘Not applicable’.
We dichotomize the final outcome, citizen altercation, to indicate whether an officer
had experienced a physical confrontation with a citizen (“Have suspects or civilians ever gotten
physical with you?”). Unfortunately, even though such acts could range from defensive
resistance to a full-on assault, the question does not specify the exact nature of the physical
altercation.
Independent Variables
Treatment measure
Based on responses to the survey item, “Indicate the highest level of education
completed,” we operationalized the focal independent variable, educational attainment, as a
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three-level categorical variable: 0 = high school only, 1 = some college, 2 = bachelor’s degree or
higher.
Covariates
Our analysis includes controls found in prior work (Ivie and Garland, 2011; Manis et al.,
2008; Miller, 2015; Paoline and Terrill, 2007; Rydberg and Terrill, 2010; Stichman et al., 2010),
as well as theoretically relevant controls typically unobserved in previous studies. We
categorized these variables into two groups. The first group of predictors measures officer and
work-related characteristics. Since researchers have found that more experienced officers are
less likely to rely on force during police/citizen interactions (Paoline and Terrill, 2007; Rydberg
and Terrill, 2010; Johnson et al., 2005), we control for tenure in years. Officer age is also
measured in years. An officer’s rank or duty assignment might also affect his/her involvement
in police-citizen violence (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008). Thus, for the dichotomous measure,
high rank, we assigned lower ranked officers (i.e., officer trainee, officer, and agent) and higher
ranked officers (i.e., detective, sergeant, and lieutenant or above) a value of 0 and 1,
respectively. Since duty assignments requiring regular suspect contacts increase the
opportunity for potentially violent encounters (Campbell et al., 2017; Chapman, 2012), we
incorporated routine citizen contact (1 = yes) (e.g., “Do you routinely have contact with
suspects?”). Veteran status is a dichotomous variable indicating whether an officer has ever
served in the armed forces (e.g., “Did/do you serve in the military?”). Married is a binary
variable identifying those officers who were married at the time of the survey (1 = yes). Male is
also measured dichotomously (1 = male). We measure race/ethnicity as a simple dichotomy
(i.e., white vs. nonwhite) as there are relatively few nonblack minority officers in our sample.
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Lastly, we operationalized the measure, investigated, from the following survey item: “If you
have ever experienced being the subject of an IID [internal investigation division] investigation,
please indicate how much it emotionally affected you,” with response options ‘Not at all,’ ‘A
little,’ ‘Very much,’ and ‘Not applicable’. Officers indicating an emotional response were coded
with a “1” and those responding ‘not applicable’ were coded with a “0”.
The second group of predictors describes officer work attitudes and outlooks. To
preserve degrees of freedom, avoid issues of multicollinearity, and determine the meaningful
factor structure, we conducted exploratory polychoric factor analysis (EPFA) on 36 candidate
items measured using Likert-type scales (Holgado-Tello et al., 2010). As the factors are likely
correlated, we applied an oblique promax rotation (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Ford et al., 1986;
Gorsuch, 1997; Thompson, 2004). The EPFA identified three distinct factors with loadings of .40
or higher, conceptualized as job stress, job contentment, and perceived organizational fairness,
that account for 80% of the total variance. A scree plot of eigenvalues (minimum value close to
1) verified the three-factor structure (see Figure A1.1), and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value (KMO
= .93) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p = .000) confirmed the suitability of the data for factor
analysis. Further, while there is no standardized minimum sample size for EPFA, our observed
sample size reflects a 27:1 respondent to item ratio, exceeding the strictest ratio
recommendation of 20:1 (Osborne, 2014). Table A1.1 presents factor analysis results, including
items and factor loadings.
Police officers’ routine exposure to traumatic events such as shootings, violence, and
handling deceased persons increase their risk for stress-related issues (Violanti et al., 2006).
(Shucard et al., 2012). The fallout from stress and trauma may include intrusion (e.g.,
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nightmares), avoidance of trauma related stimuli (e.g., distressing thoughts), negative cognition
and mood alterations (e.g., problems recalling key aspects of the traumatic event), and changes
in arousal and reactivity (e.g., difficulty concentrating) (APA, 2013). For these reasons, the first
variable, job stress, assesses whether officers are dealing with work-related pressures and
strain. This variable encompassed 16 items measured on four-point Likert-type scales ranging
from ‘never’ to ‘always’, explaining 61% of the variance: (e.g., In the past 6 months, how often
did you have had spells of terror or panic, feelings of hopelessness, felt physically, emotionally,
and spiritually depleted, and etc.). Higher values are associated with greater levels of stress.
The next variable, job contentment, measures an officer’s level of workplace
satisfaction. Low job satisfaction can lead to negative occupational behaviors such as poor
performance, work avoidance, decreased morale, job turnover, and physical or legal liabilities
(Dantzker, 1993, 1997; Dantzker and Kubin, 1998; Gau et al., 2013; Paoline et al., 2015; Terrill
and Paoline, 2015). Despite the absence of an agreed upon definition of job contentment
(Paoline and Gau, 2020), previous studies have generally measured this construct with a broad
range of items covering the adequacy of benefits, social value and prestige, role conflict,
cynicism, supervision quality, job stress, self-fulfillment, satisfaction with advancement
opportunities, and peer cohesion (see Paoline and Gau, 2020 for a comprehensive review of the
literature). Our construct capturing job contentment includes seven items measured on fivepoint Likert-type scales ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ (e.g., likely to look
for a job outside of the department) that accounts for 11% of the variance. Higher values signify
stronger contentment with the job.
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The last variable in this category is organizational fairness. Numerous studies in the
organization/industrial psychology and management traditions report a robust association
between perceptions of organizational fairness and employees’ behaviors and attitudes
(Colquitt et al., 2001; Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Likewise, in a limited number of police
studies, scholars observed that perceived fairness influences organizational commitment, job
satisfaction, task performance, cooperation, and policy compliance (Donner et al., 2015; Hass et
al., 2015). Scholars generally conceptualize this construct as consisting of three broad domains:
distributive, procedural, and interactional fairness (Colquitt et al. 2005; Colquitt et al., 2013).
Distributive fairness refers to the perceived justness of personnel outcomes, procedural
fairness concerns adjudication processes, and interactional fairness refers to management’s
treatment of employees (Bies and Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2013). Our
measure for organizational fairness is based on four statements (e.g., promotions in this
department are tied to ability and merit) with response ranging from 1 = “strongly agree” to 5 =
“strongly disagree” and explains 8% of the variation. Higher scores correspond with more
perceived fairness in departmental processes.
Analytic Strategy
We used a doubly robust inverse probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA)
propensity analysis design to compare the risk for violent police-citizen outcomes between
officers of varying education levels. To handle missing data in a statistically robust manner, we
employed multiple imputation (Little and Rubin, 2002). In this section, we outline details of our
analytical approach. All analyses were conducted with Stata 15.1.
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Multiple imputation of missing data
Although levels of item missingness did not exceed 11.1% for any measure, a complete
case analysis (CCA) would drop 209 cases or 18.9% of the sample. Missing data can lead to a
loss of statistical power and biased treatment effects depending on the pattern of missing data.
MCAR describes missingness unrelated to the treatment, covariates, or the outcome; MAR
concerns missingness related to the treatment or covariates, but not the outcome; and MNAR
refers to missingness potentially associated with the outcome (Rubin, 1987).
Multiple imputation (MI) is a rigorous method for addressing missing data. Under the
assumption that the missingness is non-ignorable (MCAR or MAR), MI produces valid
inferences. Although non-ignorability is not directly testable, we explored patterns of
missingness to ascertain the plausibility that the missing data are MCAR or MAR using Little's
MCAR test. The results suggest the MCAR assumption is untenable. However, the covariatedependent missingness extension of Little's test indicates that data were consistent with a MAR
pattern (Little's CDM test: χ2 = 8.44, df = 84, p = 1.00), highlighting the need to account for
missing data in our analysis.
We employed fully conditional multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) to
iteratively replace the missing values (Royston and White, 2011; White et al. 2011). This process
creates multiple datasets so that the standard errors of the estimates reflect the uncertainty
about the missing values. Per standard practice, the MICE prediction equations included all
relevant measures to preserve the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables (Allison, 2002; Graham, 2009). The imputation models proceeded through 10 random
draws from the posterior predictive distribution of each variable before generating a single
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imputed data set, m. To calculate the appropriate number of m’s for the analysis, we applied
von Hippel’s (2018) two-stage quadratic rule-based approach. The first stage produced a
conservative fraction of missing information (FMI) estimate and the number of imputations
needed was estimated using the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for FMI during the
second stage. Results indicated that m = 35 was sufficient. Visual inspection of trace plots
confirmed convergence, meaning that the distributions of the observed, imputed, and
completed values were similar. We base our interpretations on the imputed model as
sensitivity analysis not accounting for missingness produced similar results (complete case
analyses not presented but available upon request).
We checked for multicollinearity between variables, and not surprisingly, tolerance
values (1/VIF) for the measures age and tenure appeared to be collinear with respective 1/VIFs
of .16 and .18. Although the values reached the minimum tolerance level of .10 (Tabachnick and
Fidell, 2001), they fell just below the conservative threshold of .25 (Adeboye et al., 2014).
Otherwise, diagnostic tests showed no indication of multicollinearity among covariates
(average variance inflation factors [VIF] = 1.9). We ran alternate models with either one or both
measures, and little change occurred in the strength, direction, and significance of the observed
effects (results available upon request). For this reason, we decided to include both measures
in the final analysis.
Propensity score model
Persons do not end up in college at random. Instead, various factors influence who is
likely to attend and complete college (e.g., socioeconomic status) (see Cappelli, 2020). As
officers with varying levels of education differ from one another (i.e., high school education
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only, some college background, and bachelor’s degree), observed differences in outcomes
between these groups of officers could be correlated with certain baseline characteristics. For
example, among other factors, prior scholarship indicates that increased financial difficulties,
academic pressures, and the social transition to adulthood, especially for first-year college
students, represent major barriers to college completion (Hartley, 2011; Park et al., 2012; Wei
et al., 2005). Some scholars, therefore, suggest that beyond academic preparedness, family
background, and goal orientation (Nunez and Cuccaro-Alamin, 1998), differences in emotional
and educational resilience are predictive of college success (Cassidy, 2015; Hartley, 2011).
Because our study draws on observational data that were collected after officers attained their
educational credentials, bias from self-selectivity is likely. Thus, to accurately identify the
effects of education, we must utilize methods that allow for valid comparisons between officers
who completed college versus those with some or no college education.
To mitigate selection bias and imbalance among covariates, we adopted an inverse
probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) approach. This approach holds two
advantages over traditional propensity score strategies. For one, IPWRA estimators tout a
doubly robust property which returns consistent estimates, even when one of the two models
(treatment or outcome) is incorrectly specified (Cattaneo, 2010)—a feature not found with
standard weighting methods. Specifically, our doubly robust model combines two methods
(IPW and RA) to estimate propensity score weights balancing on the treatment and weighted
regression coefficients of the outcome simultaneously (Cattaneo, 2010; Imbens, 2000; Lechner,
2001; Robins et al., 1995). The IPW or treatment model calculates the weighted averages based
on observed factors or the inverse of the predicted probabilities of attaining each measured
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level of education for each officer. This step ensures that the treatment and comparison groups
are statistically similar based on observed covariates. Using the reweighted data, the outcome
or RA model estimates the net education effects by averaging the differences between the
expected outcomes across officer education levels (Abadie and Imbens, 2011). Secondly, this
approach accommodates a multivalued treatment, which may prove more insightful than
standard propensity score designs that are only applicable to binary treatments. By accounting
for a range of education levels, we can better characterize the multivalued nature of
educational attainment and its impact at these various levels.
For the multivalued treatment, we estimate a multinomial logit treatment model. Let
officer i have a violent police-citizen incident {Yi = Yi (t), t ∈ T}. The treatment status t indicates
the realized value of a random treatment variable T ∈ T. T = {0,1,2} depicts the multivalued
treatment variable, where T represents the three education levels: 0 if high school only; 1 if
some college experience; and 2 if bachelor’s degree. For each officer i, we observed Yi = Yi (t) if
he/she attained education level Ti = t.
For the outcome model, we estimate a binary logit model for each of the three
outcomes. The outcome variables (for example, police shootings) Yi (t) corresponding to each
treatment level, t1 and t2 (some college experience and college completion, respectively), are
compared to the comparison group’s (non-college) t0 outcomes. The treatment effect is
expressed as Yi (t0) − Yi (t2) (e.g., non-college officers versus bachelor-degreed officers). IPWRA
analyses produce treatment effect estimates that reflect the mean outcome difference for
police-citizen violence for officers with some college education and those with a bachelor’s
degree relative to non-college educated officers.
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While all covariates were included in the outcome model, covariate selection for the
treatment model requires additional consideration. While the doubly robust approach guards
against misspecification, additional steps are taken to provide greater confidence in our model
specification. Despite some disagreement in the literature, simulation studies suggest that
incorporating all covariates potentially related to the outcome in propensity score estimation,
irrespective of their relationship to treatment, reduce the bias and variance of treatment effect
calculations (Brookhart et al., 2006; Pearl, 2011; Rubin and Thomas, 1996; Wyss et al., 2013). In
contrast, measures that strongly predict treatment but not the outcome should be excluded
from the propensity score model (Pearl, 2011). Such variables could amplify bias due to
unmeasured confounding (Wyss et al., 2013, Myers et al., 2011), thereby decreasing the
precision of treatment effect estimates.
Since the temporal order of most study variables is unknown, we included all measures
in a series of logistic and multinomial regression models using imputed data to detect
significant predictors of police-citizen violence and educational attainment, respectively.
Outcomes were associated with the observed values of tenure, age, high ranked, citizen
contact, veteran status, married, male, investigated, and organizational fairness. The measures,
age, high ranked, and organizational fairness, were also significantly related to educational
attainment, making them empirical confounders that reduce the nonsystematic bias due to a
chance association. Thus, these nine covariates comprise the treatment model.
Sound inference using an IPWRA estimator relies on two strong assumptions:
conditional independence assumption and the overlap assumption (DuGoff et al., 2014;
Heinrich et al., 2010; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The conditional independence assumption
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(CIA) or unconfoundedness implies that treatment assignment is exogenous conditional on
baseline variables, meaning that once conditioned on the covariates, the treatment is “as good
as random.” This assumption is strong in that selection into treatment could be based on
unobservables (Wooldridge, 2010). Indeed, capturing all conceptually relevant factors with
observational data is no easy task, and to the extent that we do not measure relevant balancing
factors, our results may be biased. Nonetheless, our study controls are good proxies of factors
that might affect educational attainment among police officers.
The overlap assumption holds that each respondent has an equal probability of
receiving each treatment level, or in our case, each measured level of college education. If this
condition is met, we can assume that the comparison groups are statistically equivalent on
observed measures (see Bang and Robins, 2005; Cattaneo, 2010; Hirano and Imbens, 2001;
Linden et al., 2016; Robins et al., 1995; Scharfstein et al., 1999; van der Laan and Robins, 2003;
Wooldridge; 2007 for further discussion on double robustness and multivalued treatments).
Covariate balance
For the IPWRA analysis within a MI framework, covariate balance is assessed for
each dataset, m. We assessed covariate balance both graphically and statistically for each of the
35 imputed datasets separately. To check the overlap of propensity scores, we base our visual
inspection on the estimated densities of the probability of obtaining each level of education.
Figure A2 shows that the estimated densities have little mass around 0 or 1, suggesting no
serious violations of the overlap assumption.
Stata software is not set up for statistical diagnostics of propensity score estimation
with MI data. Following prior research (Hayes and Groner, 2008; Leyrat et al., 2019), we
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performed diagnostics by averaging the standard mean difference (SMD) and variance ratio
(VR) statistics across the 35 imputed models for our statistical assessment of balance. While no
concrete evidence supports a particular threshold, most empiricists agree that a SMD less than
0.2 (Linden and Samuels, 2013) and VR between 0.5 and 2 (Rubin, 2001) would suggest
negligible residual differences in the distribution of the baseline covariates between groups.
VRs were generally within bounds in the unweighted sample but improved in the weighted.
SMDs initially fell outside the threshold in 33% of covariates, all of which showed acceptable
balance after weighting (see Table A1.3 in Appendix). Since correlation designs (e.g., OLS
estimation) found in prior research are inconsistent and produce biased coefficients in the
presence of endogeneity, standard logistic regression analysis is also performed to assess the
sensitivity of estimates to imbalance among measured covariates. Per recommendations we
report both the unweighted and weighted PSA results.
Findings
Table 1.1 presents imputed descriptive statistics for the study variables, including the
percentage of cases with imputed missing values. Over a quarter (26%) of the sampled officers
had shot a citizen/suspect, most officers reported involvement in a violent arrest (90%), and
more than three-quarters (78%) experienced a physical altercation with a citizen/suspect.4 Just

4

Even with Baltimore’s history of violence, police shootings, misconduct, and zero-tolerance enforcement, (DOJ,

2016; Wilber and Recton, 2016), the number of officers reporting involvement in a police shooting appears high.
No other study analyzing the Police Stress and Domestic Violence in Police Families in Baltimore, Maryland data
operationalized the police shooting item as a dichotomous variable, preventing us from making empirical
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over 55% of the 1,104 officers completed some college coursework, and nearly 30% attained a
bachelor's degree or higher. Table 1.1 also shows that 86% of the officers identified as male,
36% were non-white, 35% had prior military experience, 60% were married, and 65% endured
an internal affairs investigation. Most of the respondents held the rank of patrol officer (69%),
and about 73% had duties that involved regular interactions with citizens. The average officer
age and years of service in the Baltimore Police Department was 36 years and 11.5 years,
respectively.
For our propensity score analysis, we report the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATET) for three violent police-citizen outcomes (police-involved shootings, violent arrests, and
citizen altercations), which corresponds to the impact of higher education among officers that
attended or graduated from college. In support of our first hypothesis, while having some
college experience is not statistically relevant to police shootings, we find that on average,
obtaining a bachelor’s degree is significantly associated with a .10 lower probability of having
been involved in an on-duty shooting, respectively, relative to the counterfactual condition of
high school education only.
We estimate educational attainment’s effects on officers’ involvement in violent arrests
and citizen altercations in the next two models (Panel B in Table 1.2). Contrary to our
expectations, we find no statistically significant association between education and violent

comparisons. While we find no evidence challenging this measure’s accuracy, the possibility remains that some
respondents may have misreported this information.
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arrests or citizen altercations.5 In fact, the direction of effects runs opposite our expectations,
although, again, these effects are not significant.
Sensitivity Analysis
Research demonstrates that propensity score methods generally return treatment
effect estimates closer to the true marginal treatment effect than standard regression models
(Amoah et al., 2020; Martens et al., 2008). To illustrate the advantages of our approach, we
compare the doubly robust results to those from traditional covariate-adjusted regression.
Similar to previous studies, a logit regression model was developed to predict college-educated
officers’ involvement in violent confrontations, net all measured covariates. The regression
coefficients were converted to reflect the ATET by calculating the difference between college
education’s predicted marginal effects and those for high school education.
The findings from the main and sensitivity analyses are qualitatively similar but slightly
differ in terms of statistical significance and effect sizes (see Panel A in Table 1.2). Like the main
findings, we detect a statistically insignificant relationship between educational attainment and
citizen altercations. Contrastingly, the sensitivity analysis indicates non-significant education
effects for police shootings. The reported effect size associated with a bachelor’s degree in the
doubly robust model is also twice as large, suggesting that covariate imbalance slightly
depressed the effects of education in the unweighted police shootings model. Also, while the
effect sizes were similar in both models, unlike the primary results, we find that the association

5

Covariate coefficients from the multinomial logit treatment model and logit outcome model are not presented

but available upon request.
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between a bachelor’s degree violent arrest is statistically significant (Table A1.4). While these
represent marginal differences, to the extent that we have measured all relevant confounders
and achieved proper balance and overlap, the doubly robust estimates promise to provide less
biased results than standard regression analyses.
Discussion
Since the early part of the twentieth century, improving the education profile of
American law enforcement remains a centerpiece of police reform initiatives. From August
Vollmer to the 1967 President’s Commission, and most recently, the 2015 President’s Task
Force, various experts and federal commissions have called for more college-educated officers
on the streets to, among other reasons, reduce police-citizen violence. The research dedicated
to understanding the effects of educational attainment on violent police encounters shows
mixed results, owing in part to the preponderance of correlational designs and the omission of
critical measures for officer work attitudes and experiences.
To address these shortcomings, our study capitalized on the Police Stress and Domestic
Violence in Police Families in Baltimore, Maryland data (Gershon, 1999) using a doubly robust
IPWRA estimator that combines weighting and regression methods to guard against selection
bias. The advantages of this approach include its production of consistent estimates even if one
of the underlying methods relies on a misspecified model and the accommodation of
multivalued treatments. Other methodological innovations of this study include the application
of multiple imputation to address missing data and the inclusion of measures capturing officer
work attitudes and perceptions.
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Among a sample of 1,104 Baltimore city officers, our analysis demonstrated that
bachelor-degreed officers are slightly less likely to fire a weapon at citizens, but officers of both
college levels are no less likely to make violent arrests and encounter combative persons. While
open to multiple interpretations, we reason our findings reflect the saliency of the outcomes.
That is, for more salient events, such as shootings, education appears to reduce the risks of
such involvement in small but meaningful ways. Relative to violent arrests and physical
altercations that are more common in policing, shootings reflect signatory events that garner
heightened media and agency attention. Thus, the effects of the unique attributes and skills
possessed by bachelor-degreed officers may only emerge during the most serious liability
situations.
Along this vein, we speculate that our shooting finding reflects a consequence of
prolonged college exposure, wherein officers sharpen the cognitive, affective, and critical
reasoning skills advantageous to such high-stakes decision-making. Educational attainment is a
robust predictor of advanced critical reasoning skills—especially among college graduates
(Bebeau and Thoma, 2003; King and Mayhew, 2002), and by extension, foresight and better
discernment (Facione, 2009; Halpern, 1998; Helsdingen et al., 2011; Pascarella and Terenzini,
1991). In the context of policing, when officers pay more attention to surrounding dangers and
take a more measured approach in their interactions, the chances of misinterpreting innocuous
behaviors as imminent threats decrease and suspects are less likely to behave in ways that elicit
force (Fyfe, 1986; Klinger et al., 2016).
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Moving Forward
Although we believe that our study provides an important advancement over prior
research, there remains ample room for improvement. First, the data are 20 years old, and
policing has indeed evolved since then. Second, despite our use of propensity score methods,
the data are cross-sectional and therefore appropriate caution should be used when
interpreting the results of our analyses. Further, the study data come from Baltimore during the
early 1990s, so the relationship between officer education and violent police encounters may
not be generalizable to other times and places.
Next, the estimator used to analyze the data only accounts for observed variables.
While we included both established predictors and relevant variables omitted in prior research,
our design remains blind to other unobservables. Absent a randomized experimental evaluation
(which is not feasible in this case), we cannot rule out the possibility that systematic differences
exist in unobservable characteristics predictive of educational attainment, such as officers’
motivation for advancement and ability to self-improve performance. Thus, any unmeasured
factors could lead to biased estimates. For example, if unobservable characteristics result in
more career-oriented officers systematically being more likely to attend and graduate from
college, we could underestimate education’s effects. Conversely, given the correlation between
proactive enforcement and the use of force, our estimates would be biased upward if
unmeasured performance incentives (e.g., merit pay) related to officer enforcement vigor (e.g.,
arrest) were provided.
To better control for unobserved forces, a major task for future research is to
incorporate a more comprehensive set of covariates covering specific duty assignments, work
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and career outlooks, demographics, personality traits, job strains, family life, and moral
judgment faculty. Future research should examine how these underlying factors moderate or
mediate the effects of educational attainment on police behavior. Moreover, only officer
information was included in this analysis. Studies would also benefit from including measures
that capture ecological (e.g., violent crime rate), situational (e.g., call type), and suspect
features (e.g., demeanor). Relatedly, future studies could employ instrumental variables (IV) to
address residual confounding. Based on research findings in education, economics, and
medicine, future scholarship could leverage compulsory schooling laws, state school
characteristics, and parental background indicators (e.g., mother’s education level) as
candidate instruments (see Hamad et al., 2019; Nguyen et al., 2016).
Because the focus of the data was not specifically on educational attainment, officer
education level was measured with a single item. Future research should include various
measures that capture related factors, such as the corresponding aptitude, cognitive ability,
motivation, effort, and skills. In addition, measures indicating whether the degree was earned
before or during police employment, the college major, social activities, and whether they
attended online or traditional courses should be considered moving forward.
Finally, given the utilization of a cross-sectional design and potential for unmeasured
confounding, our results should not be considered causal. However, our findings should be
viewed as a robust estimation of the association between officer education and police-citizen
violence. Such results are useful for establishing evidence of a causal argument. Thus, further
examination of the potential causal effects of higher education on officer performance is
warranted.
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Conclusion
In the first doubly robust, quasi-experimental study of the impacts of officer education
attainment on violent police-citizen encounters, we observed that the more salient and costly
outcome of police shootings was diminished for bachelor-degreed officers, whereas education
had no statistically significant association with two other more common policing outcomes.
Whether these findings can be explained by differences that predate officers’ college
enrollment or were cultivated during college is beyond the scope of the data. However, we
reason that police shootings are more salient, and thus have more relevance with respect to
the theoretically important factors. Violent arrests and physical altercations, in contrast, are
less salient and thus may not follow or support the theory. This ambiguity, nonetheless, leaves
open the question of whether education capital building in law enforcement is cost beneficial
due to higher salaries, education pay incentives, and tuition reimbursement. Our findings
suggest, however, that agencies that hire bachelor-degreed officers may see a pay off in
reduced police shootings and mitigation of associated costs.
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2 Higher Education and Police Misconduct: It Takes More Than A College Degree
Introduction
Officers take an oath to wield their authority morally and ethically. When police actions
deviate from this ideal, society is harmed. High-profile incidents of police misconduct such as
the deaths of George Floyd and Eric Garner while in police custody may foment public outrage,
but the cumulative effects of everyday police incivilities and lower-level abuses of power also
have implications for police legitimacy and citizen compliance with the law (Harris and Worden,
2014; Tyler, 2004). Beyond a tarnished public image, improper police behavior, especially when
concentrated in over-policed communities, engenders mistrust and undermines the authority
of law enforcement (National Research Council, 2004; Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).
Over the past 50 years, civic leaders, academics, and federal commissions have
repeatedly pitched hiring more officers with a college background as one solution to mitigate
police misconduct (e.g., see National Research Council, 2004; President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, 2015; Sherman and the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police
Officers, 1978). This claim is supported by the proposition that college-educated officers are
more inclined to honor an oath to police justly and uphold the law, and in turn, help restore the
public’s trust in law enforcement (Carter and Sapp, 1990; Sterling, 1974).
Interdisciplinary theory and research supporting this proposition consistently
demonstrate a positive relationship between educational achievement and moral
development. These studies suggest that as more workers with college experience join an
organization, they will promote increased morality and ethical behavior (King and Mayhew,

47

2002; Kohlberg, 1969, 1984; Treviño and Nelson, 2017; Victor and Cullen, 1988). Therefore,
scholars and administrators expect college-educated employees to bring qualities that help
cultivate a more ethical organizational culture (Bebeau and Thoma, 2003; King and Mayhew,
2002).
Existing police literature, however, provides mixed support for the educational
attainment-misconduct association. Studies examining college education’s effects on
misconduct have been conducted at both the officer-level and agency-level. Officer-level
research demonstrates that college-educated officers generate fewer complaints than those
with less education (Brandl et al., 2001; Cascio, 1977; Cohen and Chaiken, 1972; Kane and
White, 2009; Kappeler et al., 1992; Lersch and Kunzman, 2001; Manis et al., 2008; Sanderson,
1977). Agency-level research, in contrast, suggests a null relationship (Cao et al., 2000; Cao and
Huang, 2000; Eitle et al., 2014; Terrill and Ingram, 2016).
We posit that three key limitations underlie the mixed findings on the police educationmisconduct link. First, despite the complex nature of this association, the research tends to be
atheoretical. Second, the methods tend to be correlational and thus likely suffer from
endogeneity issues. Third, few empirical works on the educational antecedents of police
misconduct evaluate a large sample of jurisdictions. Thus, unresolved research gaps remain.
We tackle these challenges to extend the literature substantively, theoretically, and
methodologically. Drawing on interdisciplinary perspectives and data from the Police Use of
Force: Official Reports, Citizen Complaints, and Legal Consequences Project (Pate and Fridell,
1993), we employ a doubly robust propensity score approach while accounting for the complex
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survey design and missing data to examine the effects of higher education on misconduct
complaints among 1,023 U.S. police agencies.
This paper takes the following course. We begin by detailing our theoretical rationale.
We then move to a discussion of the literature examining the impacts of higher education on
police misconduct. After describing the data, methods, and findings, the article closes with a
discussion of implications for policy and practice.
Theoretical Rationale
Police Subculture: A Compass for Officer Behavior
The first step in controlling police misconduct concerns addressing the problem of police
subculture. Police officers work in a high-pressure and polarizing profession that fosters
subcultural beliefs defined as “protective, supportive, and shared attitudes, values,
understandings, and views of the world” (Inciardi, 1990, p. 227). A cynical “police worldview,”
which describes negative, distrustful, and hostile attitudes towards the job and the public,
represents a defining feature of police subculture (Skolnick, 2002; Wilson, 1968). Police
misconduct, such as becoming overly forceful toward citizens, is a product of increased police
cynicism (Muir, 1977; Skolnick, 2002; Worden, 1996). In departments where sworn personnel
widely share this sentiment, misconduct is often learned and even endorsed (Skolnick, 2002;
Wilson, 1968), creating an organizational culture conducive to the mistreatment of citizens.
Recognizing that “organizational culture eats policy for lunch,” the 2015 President’s
Taskforce (p. 11), emphasized the imperativeness of a cultural shift in policing before the
implementation of new programs or reform initiatives (see also Bradford et al., 2014; Wolfe
and Piquero, 2011). Apart from other organizational factors, including managerial practices,
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administrative policies, and training, agency hiring decisions are the single-most important
determinant of department culture (Lee et al., 2013). Since college-educated officers are
believed to hold more progressive and ethical values (Carter and Sapp, 1990), reformers
contend that they can disrupt the homogeneity of conventional values and norms in policing
(National Research Council, 2004). While the impact of college-educated officers on police
culture remains unclear, stakeholders across most professions maintain that higher education
improves employees’ attitudes and work behavior (Astin, 1977; Chomal and Baruah, 2014;
Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005; Roberts and Glick, 1981).
Disrupting Subculture: Higher Education, Moral Reasoning, and Ethical Climate
Theoretical work suggests a complex relationship between educational attainment and
ethical behavior. In particular, Kohlberg’s (1969) theory of moral development proposes that
moral maturity is a byproduct of cognitive development and involves a multistage process
whereby a person transitions from self-interested thinking to more enlightened reasoning that
emphasizes the welfare of all citizens. That is, a morally progressive person critically evaluates
dilemmas through an altruistic lens, and decisions about what is right are only made after
deliberating the sides of all potentially affected parties (Juujärvi et al., 2010; Kohlberg, 1969,
1984).
Kohlberg (1984) posits that the ability to handle moral conflicts can be taught over time.
In support of this view, research consistently demonstrates that educational attainment figures
centrally in moral development (Bebeau and Thoma, 2003; Good and Cartwright, 1998; Hood,
1984; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Rest, 1979; Rest and Thoma, 1985; Treviño et al., 2006). A
robust literature indicates that moral agency increases during college years and tends to remain
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in the years following graduation (King and Mayhew, 2002; McNeel, 1994; Rest, 1986; Rest,
Thoma, and Bebeau, 1999). For example, using the Defining Issues Test (DIT)—an instrument
developed to measure moral reasoning competencies—Bebeau and Thoma (2003) find moral
reasoning increases consistently across the college career. Further, in a meta-analysis of 172
DIT studies, King and Mayhew (2002) concluded that intentional or not, educational attainment
enhances moral judgment. A long record of research also shows that principled moral reasoning
predicts moral conduct such as ethical workplace behavior (Arnold and Poneman, 1991) and
whistleblowing (Brabeck, 1984). As such, these associations suggest that changes influenced by
college education should result in morally grounded decision-making, resulting in fewer
founded complaints of misconduct.
Work climate theory helps us incorporate contextual effects into this framework and
provides guidance on the collective effects of worker values and characteristics. One such
perspective is Victor and Cullen’s (1987) ethical climate theory. Building on Kohlberg’s work,
they conceptualized ethical climate as “the shared perception of what is correct behavior, and
how ethical situations should be handled in an organization” (1987, p. 51). Various
organizational factors contribute to the ethical climate, including training standards, policy,
reward structures, disciplinary processes, and the personal characteristics of employees (KishGephart et al., 2010; Martin and Cullen, 2006; Newman et al., 2017; Treviño and Nelson, 2017;
Victor and Cullen, 1988; Wimbush et al., 1997). Reflective of the ethical conventions and moral
identity of organizations, group-based norms frame individual members’ decision-making
(Victor and Cullen, 1988). Misconduct occurs when the collective body of workers view
aberrant behavior as trivial or matter of fact (Mayer et al., 2009).
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In the context of policing, if department members widely view citizens as untrustworthy
and unappreciative of police services (Skolnick, 1994), a culture permissive of misconduct can
develop among the ranks (Crank, 2014; Kappeler et al., 1998; Paoline, 2003). The theory and
research on educational attainment, moral development, and ethical climate (King and
Mayhew, 2002; Kohlberg, 1969, 1984; Treviño and Nelson, 2017; Victor and Cullen, 1988),
however, predict that as more college-educated officers join the police force, they will promote
increased morality and greater recognition of civil rights. In this way, they are expected to upset
the subculture and help cultivate a more ethical, service-oriented culture that encourages the
fair treatment of citizens.
Prior Research
Higher Education and Police Misconduct
The research on higher education and police misconduct examines both officer and
department level outcomes. Officer level studies suggest an inverse relationship between
holding a bachelor’s degree and misconduct (Brandl et al., 2001; Carter and Sapp, 1988; Harris
and Worden, 2014; Kane and White, 2009; Kappeler et al., 1992; Lersch and Kunzman, 2001;
Manis et al., 2008). For example, in one of the first studies in this area, Sanderson (1977) found
that Los Angeles Police Department officers with 4-year college degrees received about a third
fewer complaints than those with some college background or no college experience.
Fifteen years later, Kappeler and colleagues (1992) observed similar results among
officers from a midwestern agency. Likewise, Kane and White’s 2009 study of New York City
police officers demonstrated that college education had a strong protective effect, as some
college experience, completion of an associate’s degree, and obtaining a bachelor’s degree
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were associated with a respective 72%, 80%, and 82% lower likelihood of committing careerending misconduct than less educated officers. More recently, Harris and Worden (2014)
reported that officers with a bachelor’s degree were not only less likely to be named in
complaints but when they were, the time between allegations was longer compared to officers
without a degree.
In contrast, most studies employing agency-level data report no statistically discernable
education effects (Cao et al., 2000; Cao and Huang, 2000; Eitle et al., 2014). The one exception
is Shjarback and White’s (2016) study of large city departments using the 2003 Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data. They discovered that
relative to agencies without a college requirement, the citizen complaint rate was about 10%
lower for those requiring an associate’s degree.
Cao and colleagues’ two articles examining Police Use of Force: Official Reports, Citizen
Complaints, and Legal Consequences Project (PUOF) data, on the other hand, indicated a
statistically insignificant association between the proportion of bachelor-degreed officers and
misconduct complaints. In the first analysis, Cao et al. (2000) observed that the stock of collegedegreed officers exerted no measurable effects on citizen complaints of excessive, undue, and
unnecessary use of physical force. Similarly, using a five-item police abuse of power index (i.e.,
unlawful arrest/detention, illegal search or seizure, harassment and intimidation, misuse of
authority, and improper language per 1,000 officers), Cao and Huang (2000) found no
meaningful education effects on police abuse of authority complaints. Like Cao and colleagues,
our study also draws on PUOF data. As discussed in the next section, we apply more rigorous
analytical strategies and make use of the entire sample to extend the literature.
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The Current Study
Previous studies indicate both null and inverse associations between officer education
and police misconduct. Several limitations underpin these mixed findings. First, few works on
the educational antecedents of police misconduct examine a large sample of jurisdictions, with
most inquiries drawing on individual-level data from a single department or a select sample of
municipal agencies. Second, prior agency level studies focus on overall citizen complaints.
Despite providing a rough barometer of citizens’ perceptions of police, scholars concur that this
measure confounds productivity with actual bad behavior (Brandl et al., 2001; Lersch, 2002;
Terrill and McCluskey, 2002). Third, underscoring the need for more methodologically rigorous
research, this collection of quantitative findings comes exclusively from observational data
analyzed with correlational methods. Given the risk of bias due to selection, it remains unclear
whether previous findings reflect the effects of education or pre-existing features of
organizations and officers. Lastly, prior scholarship offers little theoretical justification for
predictions about the officer education-misconduct link, making the expected direction of this
relationship speculative.
We address these limitations to advance the literature in three ways. For our
substantive contribution, we examine the collective influence of college-educated officers on
substantiated agency complaint rates among a nationally representative sample of 1,023 police
departments from the Police Use of Force: Official Reports, Citizen Complaints, and Legal
Consequences data (Pate and Fridell, 1993). For our methodological contribution, this study
employs design-based analysis and multiple imputation of missing data with a doubly robust
propensity score model applied to a multivalued treatment. Finally, for our theoretical
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contribution, we draw on perspectives from developmental psychology to explain the
connection between educational attainment and police conduct. Based on theory and research
(King and Mayhew, 2002; Kohlberg, 1969, 1984; Treviño and Nelson, 2017; Victor and Cullen,
1988), we predict that, all else equal, departments with a greater proportion of bachelordegreed officers will generate fewer substantiated misconduct complaints.
Data and Methods
The data for the present study come from a national survey of U.S. police agencies
conducted in 1992—the Police Use of Force: Official Reports, Citizen Complaints, and Legal
Consequences Project (PUOF) (Pate and Fridell, 1993). Using a stratified sampling design to
survey state, county, city, and local sheriff’s departments, 1,697 agencies were initially invited
to participate. Of the selected departments, 1,111 (67.2%) completed the mail survey (for full
details, see Pate and Fridell, 1993). After we excluded agencies that do not answer service calls
or hold arrest authority, our analytic sample stands at 1,023 agencies.
Measures
Dependent Variables
Police misconduct refers to “any inappropriate behavior on the part of any law
enforcement officer that is either illegal or immoral or both” (Champion, 2001, p. 2). Examples
include perjuring on reports, using excessive force, accepting bribes or gratuities, failing to
report a fellow officer’s wrongdoings, making unlawful arrests, and demeaning citizens. To
capture the range of improper police behaviors, we consider three dependent variables
representing different types of complaints filed by both citizens and department members.
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The first outcome, abuse of authority complaints, reflects the rate of substantiated
complaints per 1,000 officers about constitutional violations and incivility. Constitutional
violations cover unlawful arrest/imprisonment, improper detention/interrogation, false
charges, and illegal search or seizure. Acts of incivility include the use of demeaning
ethnic/racial slurs, harassment, intimidation, threats, and verbal abuse. Excessive force
complaints measures the rate of founded unnecessary use of force and brutality accusations
per 1,000 officers, while total misconduct complaints is operationalized as the rate of all
credible misconduct allegations per 1,000 officers (abuse of authority and excessive force).
Focal Variable
The focal variable, college degree saturation, was calculated by dividing the percentage
of bachelor-degreed officers in an agency into tertiles based on the data distribution to
represent low (<11.7%), medium (11.7% to 25%), and high levels (>25%) of agency educational
attainment.
Covariates
We also include relevant controls, organized into four categories: 1) department
composition, 2) training measures, 3) bureaucratic controls, and 4) jurisdiction controls.
First, drawing on prior research (Cao et al., 2000; Eitle et al., 2014; Schuck and RabeHemp, 2016), we measure five dimensions of departmental composition, including percent
female, percent non-white, mean years of service, mean age, and department size. Percent
female is measured as the percentage of female officers in a department, and percent nonwhite represents the percentage of non-white officers. Mean years of service and mean age
identify the average years of experience and age for all sworn officers in a police department,
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respectively. The last measure in this group, department size, represents the total number of
sworn officers on an agency’s roster. We logged age and department size to achieve a more
normal distribution.
The next set of measures controls for the effects of police training on police misconduct
(Prenzler, 2009). Police training, for the most part, is a combination of pre-service training at
the police academy and in-service training acquired throughout an officer’s career (Morrison,
2006). The first training measure, academy hours, refers to the total training academy hours
mandated for recruits. For the two remaining training measures, we conducted an exploratory
polychoric factor analysis using promax rotation to identify the underlying factor structure
among 20 candidate items on a 3-point Likert scale, with responses ranging from 1 (not
provided) to 3 (mandatory). In contrast to the more common varimax rotation, promax rotation
allows correlation among items and thus, improves our ability to approximate the factor
structure (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Ford et al., 1986; Gorsuch, 1997; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001;
Thompson, 2004). Table A1 presents the results of the factor analysis, showing a two-factor
solution with factor loadings ranging from .54 to .79 on the first factor and .66 to .92 on the
second. These factors, conceptualized as crisis intervention training and use of force training,
explain 92% of the total variance. Inspection of scree plot and eigenvalues verified the twofactor structure (see Figure A1). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value (KMO = .94) and Bartlett’s Test of
Sphericity (p = .000) also met conventional standards (see Table B2.1 for items and factor
loadings).
Accounting for 77% of the total variance, the first in-service training measure, crisis
intervention training, consists of 4 items that evaluate whether a department provided in-
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service training on the following topics: crisis intervention (e.g., crisis intervention and suicide
prevention) and victim assistance (e.g., domestic violence and victim assistance). The second
measure, use of force training, includes 4 items covering use of force training modules such as
nonlethal force, nonlethal weapons, deadly force, and firearms requalification that explain 15%
of the variance. Higher values signify more training emphasis in these areas.
Next, we account for bureaucratic controls implemented to govern police misconduct
(Eitle et al., 2014; Hickman and Piquero, 2009; Terrill and Ingram, 2016). The first
variable, internal affairs, is dummy coded to identify departments with an internal affairs
division (1 = yes). Public dispositions distinguishes whether agencies publish summaries on
misconduct investigations (1 = yes). Citizen review denotes whether an agency had a citizen
review board (1 = yes).
The next two summative measures were modified from previous studies using PUOF
data (Cao et al., 2000; Cao and Huang, 2000). Reporting standards was calculated by
aggregating responses to 18 questions indicating the reporting policy for different use of force
events (i.e., none, optional, or mandatory), including the use of deadly force (e.g., citizens
killed), impact weapons (e.g., batons), and restraint techniques (e.g., handcuffing). We coded
items to indicate stricter use of force reporting standards (α = .86).
For the next variable, transparency, we developed a standardized summative measure
comprised of 45 items, of which 44 are binary and 1 ordinal. The first six items capture
information on complaint avenues. Respondents were asked whether their department uses
any of the following methods to inform citizens about complaint filing procedures: posters,
flyers, newsletters, public service announcements, complaint hotline, or other measures. The
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next six items concern the availability of the following complaint filing methods: anonymously,
by mail, by telegram, by telephone (main department number), by telephone (designated
number), or in person.
The next eight items were based on the question “Where can citizens file complaints of
police misconduct?” (agency headquarters, precinct stations, storefronts, civil service
commission, board of commissioners, civilian review agency, city hall, or other locations). The
next 9-items were derived from the question “Which of the following types of assistance does
your department provide when citizens file complaints?” (provides complaint form, provides
bilingual complaint form, sworn officer completes form, civilian personnel complete form, assist
non-English speakers, provides a copy of complaint report to citizens, informs citizen of case
status, informs citizens of disciplinary actions taken, and other assistance). The corresponding
question for the 9 items about places to file a complaint was “Does your department make
complaint forms available for citizens at any of the following locations?” (agency headquarters,
storefronts, fire stations, public libraries, public housing offices, city clerk's office, city council
offices, community organizations, and other locations).
The next four items indicate whether departments required special steps for filing a
complaint (sign complaint; swear to complaint; certify complaint; and notarize complaint) and
whether complaints can be submitted at any time of day. The final item reflects the time limit
for filing a report after an alleged incident (e.g., 0 = up to one month; 1 = one to three months;
2 = three to six months; 3 = six months to a year; 4 = more than a year; 5 = unlimited). Item
responses were standardized and then summed so that higher values represent more
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transparency and accountability in the complaint process (α = .74). The quadratic term for
transparency is included in the model to capture any potential nonlinear effects.6
Our last category of variables controls for contextual effects. These measures
include large population, city agency, mean part I arrests, and mean part II arrests. The binary
variable, large population, denotes whether agencies served populations of at least 50,000 (1 =
yes). While law enforcement agencies perform similar duties, their focus and the community’s
needs often vary. Thus, we include the binary variable, city agency, to account for these
differences (1 = city department). Considering the link between high productivity and
misconduct allegations (Hassell and Archbold, 2010; Lersch, 2002), we calculated the mean
total part I (e.g., murder, rape, and burglary) and part II (e.g., simple assault, fraud, and
gambling) arrests per officer.
Analytical Strategy
This study employs a doubly robust propensity score design, which estimates education
effects by comparing the outcomes between departments of varying educational attainment
levels. We applied sample weights to adjust for complex survey design and multiple imputation
procedures to deal with missing data. Sensitivity analysis were conducted to compare
treatment effect estimates from traditional regression and doubly robustly methods. We
performed all analyses using Stata 15.1.

6

Results from Poisson regression analysis revealed a significant positive linear term and negative quadratic term

for the transparency measure.
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Adjusting for complex survey design
A stratified sampling procedure was employed to select agencies by jurisdiction size to
obtain a representative sample. PUOF investigators used a directory of law enforcement
agencies from the 1990 Justice Agency List (JAL). Jurisdictions were sampled with probability
proportional to size, with large jurisdictions sampled with certainty. We account for the
complex sampling design in our analyses, adjusting for sample weights, primary sampling units
(PSUs) (i.e., police agencies), and stratification in order to produce proper test statistics and
achieve nationally representative estimates (Austin et al., 2018; Pate and Fridell, 1993).
While using sample weights with propensity score methods requires additional
consideration, the little empirical guidance on survey-weighted modeling within a propensity
score framework is mixed. Some works suggest incorporating sampling weights when
estimating the treatment effect, but not when calculating propensity scores (Zanutto, 2006).
Other scholars contend that while weighted regression is unnecessary for propensity score
estimation, they recommend that analysts treat sampling weights as covariates (DuGoff et al.,
2014). Ridgeway et al. (2015) demonstrate that incorporating sampling weights as survey
weights (as opposed to as a covariate) throughout all stages of the analysis produces reliable
results. Based on a recent evaluation of the various recommendations (Lenis et al., 2019), we
follow the advice of Ridgeway and colleagues (2015) in this study.
Multiple imputation of missing data
PUOF data is missing a substantial amount of information on key variables, with missing
data in our study ranging from .09% to 30.42% for specific variables (see Table 2.1). If not
properly addressed, missing data can lead to biased treatment effect estimates. The pattern of
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missingness informs how missing data should be addressed. According to Little and Rubin’s
(2002) taxonomy, there are three missing data patterns or mechanisms. Data are categorized as
missing completely at random (MCAR) if the missingness is unrelated to the outcome, missing
at random (MAR) if missingness is related to the observed outcome and possibly the observed
covariates, or missing not at random (MNAR) if missingness is dependent on unobserved
measures.
Since listwise deletion would reduce power and introduce potential bias, we
implemented multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) to preserve 839 cases (76%)
without complete data. In addition to restoring the natural variability of the missing values, MI
incorporates the uncertainty due to the missing data, which reduces the chance of obtaining a
significant effect when the true effect is null. Achieving valid inference within an MI framework
requires data to be MCAR or MAR (Rubin, 1976). However, a direct test of MAR is not possible
since it requires unavailable information about the missing data. Instead, we can test the
stronger missing completely at random (MCAR) assumption using Little’s (1988) test. Although
there is no evidence for MCAR, the sample met the MAR assumption based on the covariatedependent missingness extension of Little’s MCAR test (Little's CDM test: χ2 = 23.14, df = 36, p
= 0.95).
Following standard practice, we include all measures, as well as the sample weights in
the MICE prediction equations to obtain accurate point estimates and standard errors
(Quartagno et al., 2019). Before producing a single imputed data set, m, the imputation models
cycled through 10 repeated draws derived from the posterior predictive distribution of each
measure. A two-stage quadratic rule-based equation (see von Hippel, 2018) calculated to
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determine the correct number of m’s indicated that our analysis required 144 imputed data
sets.
Trace plots of imputed values verified convergence of the MI algorithm. We also tested
the models for multicollinearity. All models had tolerance values (1/VIF) greater than .25,
suggesting no multicollinearity issues (average variance inflation factors [VIF] = 1.8) (Adeboye et
al., 2014).
Propensity score model
Agencies employing more bachelor-degreed officers likely differ on key characteristics
from agencies on the other end of the educational spectrum. These differences might stem
from hiring policies or could be connected to the demographic profile of an agency. Scholars
note, for example, that minorities lack the same access to advanced educational opportunities
relative to whites (Hillman, 2014, 2016). Consequently, departments requiring a bachelor’s
degree for new hires might have a lower percentage of minority officers. Our study draws on
observational data, and given the non-random allocation into higher education, we must
account for preexisting differences between departments to adjust for selection bias.
We employ a doubly robust propensity score method that combines the treatment
modeling strategy of inverse-probability weighting (IPW) with the outcome modeling strategy
of regression adjustment (RA) to balance covariates across weighted groups (Imbens, 2000;
Funk et al., 2011; Lechner, 2001). Conditional on measured baseline covariates, IPWRA
estimators use the inverse of the predicted probabilities of departments being assigned to each
of the three educational attainment levels as weights to compute averages of treatment-level
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predicted outcomes (Abadie and Imbens 2012). The contrasts of these averages provide the
estimated treatment effects given the measured confounders.
This approach is “doubly robust” to model misspecification. The doubly robust feature
allows for the consistent estimation of treatment effects even if one of the model specifications
is incorrect (Wooldridge, 2010). Bias flowing from unobserved measures, however, can be
reduced only to the extent that they correlate with observed characteristics (Funk et al., 2011).
Stata’s implementation of IPWRA allows analysts to use a multivalued treatment.
Supported by prior research and statistical theory (Hirano and Imbens, 2004; Wooldridge,
2007), this feature better captures the multivalent nature of educational attainment.7 We
estimate a multinomial logit treatment model and a Poisson outcome model, where {Yi = Yi (t), t

∈ T} represents the substantiated misconduct complaint rate for department i and treatment
status t indicates the different levels of education.
Covariate selection in propensity score (PS) analysis is key to the estimated treatment
effects’ efficiency and validity. Little empirical guidance exists, however, on covariate selection
for PS models predicting the probability of selection into educational attainment. Both theory
and simulations indicate that incorporating covariates affecting the outcomes while excluding
those affecting treatment only, control for random or chance imbalances of predictors across
treatment groups; thereby, improving the accuracy of treatment effect estimations (Brookhart
et al., 2006; Myers et al., 2011; Wyss et al., 2013). Following these conventions, we estimated
the influence of all study variables on the three outcomes and agency educational attainment

7

We considered a continuous treatment, but data and model constraints forced us to abandon this plan.
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in a series of covariate-adjusted regression models (Poisson regression for the outcomes and
multinomial logistic regression for the treatment). Based on these findings, the probability of
the observed treatment status (i.e., education level) is calculated from the following measures:
mean years of service, mean age, academy hours, crisis intervention training, reporting
standards, and city agency.8 The multivalued treatment variable is depicted by T = {0, 1, 2},
where T represents the three educational attainment levels: 0 = low (reference category); 1 =
medium; and 2 = high. For each department i, Yi = Yi (t) if education level Ti = t was attained.
Expressed as Yi (t0) − Yi (t1) and Yi (t0) − Yi (t2), we compare the control group’s (low
attainment) t0 rate of complaints with those of departments with medium and high educational
attainment levels in the outcome model (t1 and t2, respectively). We included all measures in
the outcome model. For each dependent variable, the differences between the average
predicted outcomes for the three treatment levels provided average treatment effects on the
treated (ATT) estimates.
The ATT is identified under two conditions jointly referred to as the ignorability
assumption: conditional independence assumption and the overlap assumption (DuGoff et al.,
2014; Heinrich et al., 2010; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The conditional independence
assumption (CIA) or unconfoundedness states that once we control for observable pretreatment characteristics (Xi), the selection into education level is as good as random and
therefore uncorrelated with crime outcomes:
Yit ⊥ Tit | Xi, ∀t ∈ ∧ = {0, …ϕ)
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The measures, reporting standards and city agency are predictive of both the treatment and outcomes.
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Here outcome Yit and treatment Tit are independent (⊥), given the covariates Xi. The CIA is a
strong assumption as it requires no unobservable confounders. However, we measure the most
robust predictors of educational attainment (Tit) to enhance the accuracy of our estimates.
The overlap assumption, stated as 0 < Pr [Ti = tXi = x], ∀ t∈ ∧, holds that for every Xi
there should be a positive probability that each department could be assigned to each
education level. This assumption can be assessed by plotting the estimated densities of the
probability of assignment into each education level (see Bang and Robins, 2005; Cattaneo,
2010; Hirano and Imbens, 2001; Linden et al., 2016; Robins et al., 1995; Scharfstein et al., 1999;
Wooldridge, 2007 for further discussion on double robustness).
Covariate Balance
After weighting on the estimated propensity score, large residual differences in the
distribution of the baseline covariates between the comparison groups remained. Following the
suggestions of prior research (Garrido et al., 2013; Imbens and Rubin, 2015), we respecified the
model using a stepwise approach and covariate adjustments (interaction terms) to achieve
better covariate balance while maintaining the strength and direction of the initial ATT
estimates. The final specification included indicators for the mean years of service, mean age,
academy hours, crisis intervention training, reporting standards, city agency, and an interaction
term between the mean years of service and mean age measures. Standardized mean
differences (SMD) exceeded the threshold in 64% of covariates before weighting, but all
covariates were within bounds in the weighted sample. Variance ratios met conventional
criteria in both the weighted and unweighted samples (see Table B2.2).
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Findings
Table 1 presents imputed descriptive statistics for the sample. The respective number of
abuse of authority, excessive force, and total misconduct complaints per 1,000 officers is 23.48,
4.69, and 28.18. Overall, educational attainment was classified as low in 32% of agencies,
medium in 35% of agencies, and high in 33% of agencies. Among departments, the mean
percentage of female and non-white officers is 7% and 11%, respectively. About two-thirds of
departments serviced urban jurisdictions (66%) and 68% served populations with more than
50,000 residents (see Table 2.1 for full descriptive statistics).
Panel B in Table 2.2 presents the ATT estimates for the effects of college degree
saturation on the three outcomes. We observe no significant effects of educational attainment
on misconduct rates in our main analysis. However, several findings worth noting. While the
association between education level and excessive force complaint rates leaned negative as
predicted, an unexpected pattern emerged for the two remaining outcomes. Albeit statistically
insignificant, we detected evidence of a nonlinear relationship for abuse of authority and
overall misconduct complaints.
Although misconduct transcends geography and agency type, reducing police
misconduct among large urban departments has long been the focus of federal reform efforts
(Chanin, 2017). As reported in Table 2.3 (Panel B), we conducted supplemental analyses on a
subsample of 751 city agencies serving populations of 50,000 or more. Contrary to our
expectations, all findings indicate a positive association, with abuse of authority and total
misconduct significantly greater among the highest achieving departments in terms of
educational attainment. In particular, for abuse of authority and overall misconduct complaints,
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we find that departments in the medium and high education categories generate a respective
11 and 12 more complaints per 1,000 officers than departments with low education levels. This
counterintuitive finding would indicate that educational attainment contributes to, rather than
curb, the police misconduct problem in big cities.
Sensitivity Analysis
Educational attainment is not a random process and standard regression analyses that
ignore nonrandom assignment in observational data risk biased and inconsistent estimates
(Achen, 1986; Neyman, 1990; Rosenbaum, 2002; Rubin, 2006). Given the selection forces
inherent in educational attainment, we conduct sensitivity checks against Poisson regression
findings to demonstrate the consequences of not adjusting for covariate imbalance. Panel A in
Table 2.2 shows three primary differences between the unweighted and propensity score
weighted estimates. First, the treatment effect sizes from the doubly robust models were much
larger than the regression estimates. For example, the doubly robust methodology returned
treatment effect estimates for the most educated departments that were between 10 and 16
times larger than those generated by Poisson regression for the excessive force outcome. It
appears that the lack of balance in covariate distributions may have suppressed the effects of
education. Second, in contrast to the doubly robust findings, regression models indicated
departments with medium and high educational attainment levels shared statistically
significant associations with abuse of authority and total misconduct complaints. Lastly, the
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nonlinear relationship detected between educational attainment and these two outcomes in
the doubly robust analysis did not surface in the regression analysis.9
Discussion
Police reformers expect college-educated officers to promote more ethical police
services that lead to lower misconduct rates (Carter and Sapp, 1990; National Research Council,
2004). However, prior research on the association between police education and misconduct is
mixed. These inconsistent results arise from several limitations, including underdeveloped
theory, nonrepresentative samples, and a reliance on correlational methods that fail to address
endogeneity concerns. In response to this gap, we made various methodological improvements
and incorporated interdisciplinary perspectives to examine the influence of departments’
educational composition on misconduct complaint rates.
Specifically, we extend the literature by analyzing a nationally representative sample of
1,023 police agencies using a doubly robust propensity score weighting approach that adjusts
for differences on key characteristics. Another key methodological advance includes multiple
imputation of missing data. For our theoretical advancement, we apply Kohlberg’s (1969) moral
development perspective and Victor and Cullen’s (1987) ethical work climate theory to shed
light on the predicted influence of higher education on organizational outcomes.
Our primary findings showed that the proportion of bachelor-degreed officers in
departments is not significantly related to the rate of abuse of authority, excessive force, and

9

For comparability, we transformed regression coefficients into ATET estimates by calculating the difference

between the reference category’s predicted marginal effects and those for the two highest educational attainment
levels.
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overall misconduct complaints. Albeit insignificant, an interesting pattern emerged in our
primary results. Excessive force findings leaned negative as anticipated. However, the results
for the remaining outcomes indicated a nonlinear relationship. Though unexpected, we reason
that these findings are related to police cynicism flowing from a disconnect between collegeeducated officers’ attributes and their duties.
Scholars suggest that increased cynicism among officers—a well-known precursor to
misconduct (Muir, 1977; Skolnick, 2002; Worden, 1996)—is largely indicative of departments
not transforming their organizational structures to make full use of sworn personnel’s
characteristics and skills (Miller and Fry, 1976; Trojanowicz and Nicholson, 1976; Griffin et al.,
1978). In traditional police bureaucracies, rigid regulations imposed on lower-level officers
prevent those with college experience from engaging in a more autonomous and innovative
style of policing. Such autocracy results in low morale and job dissatisfaction (Walker and
McDonald, 2009).
Several studies indicate that college-educated officers tend to be more cynical and
frustrated with the job and distrustful of citizens than their less-educated colleagues (Dantzker,
1992; Graves, 1996; Niederhoffer, 1967; Osborne, 2014; Sobol, 2010a; Paoline et al., 2000;
Paoline et al., 2015). Regoli (1976) concluded that the noted misalignment causes collegeeducated officers to become frustrated and cynical. When department members widely hold
such views, the risk for misconduct increases (Skolnick, 2002; Wilson, 1968). Thus, we speculate
that agencies with medium levels of education may not yet have revamped their operations to
mesh with their personnel. In contrast, those at high education levels might have begun making
strides in that direction.
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This logic, along with larger city departments being more prone to greater cynicism and
police misconduct complaints (Klinger, 1997, 2004), might explain the positive and statistically
significant associations observed in our supplemental analysis of big-city agencies. We found
that the most educated departments serving large jurisdictions generated roughly 11-12 more
abuse of authority and overall misconduct complaints per 1,000 officers, respectively, than
agencies with low educational attainment.
Relatedly, it is possible that our findings also reflect time period effects. Changing
culture in complex bureaucracies is difficult, and subcultural roots run deep in policing. Scholars
assert that beyond personnel decisions, for a culture shift to occur in law enforcement, police
practices must also be reoriented toward the desired change (Lum and Nagin, 2017). Along this
vein, law enforcement did not widely implement community policing programs believed to take
advantage of college-educated officers’ skills and attributes until the passage of the 1994
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act—two years after our data was collected
(Oliver, 2000). It is also worth mentioning that Section 14141 of the Crime bill authorized the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate and seek injunctions against police departments
displaying a “pattern or practice” of police misconduct and civil rights violations (D’Souza et al.,
2019). Thus, we reason that the potential offsetting effects of the pre-Crime bill era on police
misconduct suggest our study should be replicated with post-Crime bill data. Such a conclusion
also indicates that community policing innovations might facilitate the effects of higher
education, suggesting the need for mediation analysis.
Beyond addressing potential measurement issues related to misconduct (see Fyfe, 1986;
Lersch, 2002; Sherman, 1978) and the absence of structural factors in our analysis (e.g.,
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unemployment rate), several other ways to improve our study deserve mention. First,
situational factors and offender characteristics are essential in understanding police misconduct
(Hassell and Archbold, 2010; Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002) and should be explored in future
research. Second, we could only assess the influence of bachelor-degreed officers on police
misconduct rates due to data constraints. Subsequent research would benefit from replicating
this study with sworn personnel of varying education levels. Third, our study relies on crosssectional data. Considering cultural change in police organizations is a gradual process (Cohen,
2017), a longitudinal analysis of trends in agency education levels and misconduct complaints
could yield additional insight. Fourth, a remarkable amount of missing data plagues PUOF. This
challenge may partially explain why PUOF data only appears in a few articles, even though it
represents one of the most exhaustive data sources for studying police misconduct. Since a
complete case analysis would likely generate inaccurate results, we implemented a multiple
imputation procedure to increase the confidence in our findings. Despite the lengths taken to
soundly deal with missing data, the possibility remains that our estimates are biased. Thus,
these variables should be measured more reliably in future research. Lastly, unmeasured
confounding is a perpetual concern in police education research. While propensity score
weighting addresses observed differences in defining characteristics, considering alternative
approaches such as instrumental variables can provide additional insights about potential
sources of bias.
Conclusion
In this study, we were unable to find evidence of educational attainment’s protective
effect against police misconduct. Interestingly, the excessive force findings were insignificant in
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both samples but were negative for the full sample and leaned slightly positive in the big-city
sample. In addition, we observed an insignificant nonlinear association in the full analysis and
statistically significant positive association between departments with high education levels and
abuse of authority and overall misconduct complaints in the supplemental analysis of large city
departments.
We acknowledge that the findings may be attributable to several limitations, including a
large amount of missing data for the outcomes. Nonetheless, this study offers an important
contribution to the literature. We demonstrate the theoretical and methodological rigor
necessary for examining the police education-misconduct link by addressing selection bias
issues, complex survey design, and missing data challenges, all of which have been glossed over
in prior research.
We urge readers not to cast judgments about the importance of education based on our
study. However, the findings suggest that initiatives focusing solely on bolstering the
educational profile of U.S. police forces is not likely not eliminate misconduct. Doing so may
even worsen the misconduct problem considering conventional police organizations generally
constrain the discretion and creativity of college-educated officers, leading to increased police
cynicism and job discontentment among the ranks. For agencies looking to recruit and hire
college-educated officers, these findings might suggest the associated institutional and police
subculture changes may not result in a direct benefit on misconduct rates. Still, other potential
benefits remain unexplored, including how education effects may depend on how agencies
utilize officers. In particular, agencies that have high educational standards and support
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progressive policing strategies may lead to lower misconduct. In other words, there are
unexplored heterogeneities for future research.
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3 The College Sentinel: Department Education Policy and Crime Control
Introduction
From the earliest police reform efforts to present times, politicians and leading scholars
have regularly proposed more stringent police education standards as one path toward
increasing public safety (e.g., see President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, 1967; President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; Vollmer,
1931). Underpinning these calls is the optimistic assumption that adopting higher education
standards will help enhance the credibility, effectiveness, and overall quality of law
enforcement (Carter and Sapp, 1990). It also appears that officials believe that collegeeducated officers possess unique qualities and attributes advantageous to crime control. Such
expectations, for example, were evidenced by Congress’ authorization of $200 million in college
scholarships for in-service and aspiring officers under the 1994 Violent Crime Act (42 U.S.C. §
14091) to “address violent crime by increasing the number of police with advanced education
and training on community patrols.”
Despite prominent recommendations and federal investments, it remains an open
question whether raising education standards enhances crime control, especially as it concerns
the core police function of reducing serious crime. Whereas a sizeable literature exists on the
crime-suppressing effects of enhancing agency resources (e.g., force size) and instituting
proactive policing (e.g., broken windows policing) (see Braga et al., 2012; Levitt, 2002;
Weisburd et al., 2014), no studies to date have explicitly analyzed the role of police education
policy in crime prevention. This marks a critical gap in the literature, as observers have
consistently maintained that police qualifications directly influence the quality of police services
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(Sanders, 2003). For example, the early police reformer Owen W. Wilson (1953, p. 840) once
said:
Police service is rendered by individual policemen on a person-to-person basis. Its
quality, therefore, is determined by the individual men who provide it, and obviously
cannot be raised above the quality of service rendered by the individual members in the
aggregate. If police service is to be of a high caliber, the members must have suitable
qualifications…
The few available studies examining the impact of agency education policies on both
violent and property crime control suggest null effects (Chappell et al., 2006; Doerner and
Doerner, 2012; Eitle, 2005; Eitle et al., 2005; Tillyer, 2018). However, our understanding of this
association remains formative because education policy indicators are not focal in prior
research. Thus, this relationship has never been treated rigorously in the literature.
Considering the periphery focus on education policy’s crime-reduction effects, the
literature suffers from three concomitant limitations. First, this scholarship is largely
atheoretical, with hypotheses often based on conventional wisdom. Second, researchers have
tended to use correlational research designs, which cannot rigorously address endogeneity
concerns in this literature. Lastly and most salient to this study, the underlying processes that
potentially mediate the effects of education policy on agency outcomes remain unexplored.
Yet, given educational attainment’s positioning as a proxy for police effectiveness (Doerner and
Doerner, 2012), from a deterrence perspective, education policy may not only have a direct
effect on crime but may also affect crime indirectly through its impact on police arrest
productivity.
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The policy-relevant question then is not just whether higher education requirements
have an overall effect on crime but also how these standards achieve their outcomes. Our
analysis of this association enriches the literature in two ways. First, this is the only explicit
examination of departmental education requirements’ effects on offending. What is more, we
are the first to assess the potential mechanisms by which these effects occur. The other
advancement is our infusion of economic and criminological theory to formalize the
relationship between police education standards and crime control.
We capitalize on interdisciplinary perspectives and data from multiple sources to assess
the education policy-crime link. Methodologically, we integrate entropy balance reweighting
procedures with a novel mediation approach to identify the total, direct, and indirect effects of
agency education policy on crime rates in 1,543 U.S. cities using data from the Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the U.S. Census
Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).
The outline for the paper is as follows. We begin by discussing the theoretical
expectations for the effects of police education policy on crime control. Next, we review the
literature in this area, pointing out research limitations and blind spots warranting closer
examination. Following the presentation of the data, methods, and findings, the paper
culminates with the study limitations, policy implications, and future directions for research.
Theoretical Context
Studies examining the effects of police education policy on crime control are frequently
mute about the theoretical underpinnings of this association. In this section, we present an
integrated framework that builds on insights derived from economic and criminological theory.
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Education Policy and Organizational Productivity
Human Capital Theory (HCT) can be used to conceptualize the potential benefits of
higher education in policing through the lens of work output or productivity (Becker, 1964;
Mincer, 1958; Schultz, 1959). According to HCT, organizational investments in human capital
(i.e., enhancing education of workers) will increase employee productivity as a function of
increased knowledge, innovation, and commitment (Becker, 1964; Namasivayam and Denizci,
2006; Schultz, 1959). Education figures centrally in the development of human capital, which
refers to the skills and intangible assets (e.g., motivation and ambition) people possess that add
value to an organization (Becker, 1964). These theorists posit that advanced education
improves individuals’ cognitive abilities and teaches workers valuable skills that make them
more productive than their less-educated colleagues (Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1963).
The human capital literature specifies three channels through which education affects
productivity (Rosenzweig, 1995). First, education broadens a worker’s access to various
information sources. Second, education improves workers’ ability to decipher and understand
new information. Third, education increases a worker’s ability to learn from prior experiences.
Like any other profession, law enforcement has its own, albeit crude, metrics for
productivity in the form of arrests, citations, and seizures (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017;
Hodgkinson et al., 2019; Sparrow, 2015; Wellford and Cronin, 1999). Of these, arrest represents
law enforcement’s de facto performance measure, mainly due to its two primary functions:
bringing criminals to justice and reinforcing the police’s ability to solve crime and apprehend
offenders (Harmon, 2015). If the assumptions of HCT hold in policing, we expect departments
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with college requirements to show greater prowess at preventing felony crime through
increased police arrest productivity (i.e., more arrests).
Arrests as a Crime Deterrent
Four years after his publication on HCT, Becker (1968) introduced a seminal economic
model of crime predicting the deterrence effects of arrest and sanctions. While economists
approach this question with a focus on enforcement efficiency, similar to criminologists, they
maintain that the decision to offend reflects a “gamble undertaken by a rational individual”
who weighs the expected cost of committing a crime against the probability of apprehension
(Chalfin and McCrary, 2017, p. 5). In other words, if the crime costs (e.g., arrests) outweigh the
potential return (e.g., money, respect, and revenge), individuals will likely abstain from
offending.
While severity and swiftness of punishment represent critical determinants of
deterrence, the linchpin principle is the certainty of punishment. As concluded by Nagin’s
(2013) review of the literature, relative to the other crime control mechanisms, the certainty of
apprehension exerts the greatest effect on crime. The hypothesized deterrence effects of
arrests thus manifest when the perceived risk of being caught is high enough to discourage
offending among both arrested persons (specific deterrence) and the broader society (general
deterrence). From this perspective, cities with police departments more effective at locating
and apprehending criminals should experience lower crime levels.
Despite the utility of deterrence theory for understanding the police-crime link, it is not
without criticism. For one, scholars have lamented the difficulty of separating the incapacitation
effects from the deterrence effects of arrests. Nonetheless, recent works provide little evidence
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in favor of incapacitation effects (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017; Levitt, 1998; Owens, 2013),
leading researchers to conclude that the deterrence effects of arrest are empirically more
important in reducing crime (see Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). For example, Levitt (1998)
addressed early criticisms of measurement error and attributed the crime‐suppression effects
of arrests, especially for property crimes, mainly to deterrence rather than to incapacitation.
Second, some empiricists challenge the notion that intensified arrest activity averts all
offending equally (e.g., crimes of passion). Countering this point, scholarship employing
econometric techniques find that various property and violent crimes are highly responsive to
the prospect of arrest (Bun et al., 2019). Finally, critics contend that while apprehension rates
may deter arrested persons, would-be offenders in the community go undeterred. There is
mixed evidence on this point. A growing literature, however, supports the general deterrence
value of arrest-based strategies such as hot-spots, problem-oriented, and order-maintenance
policing (Braga et al., 2012; Kubrin et al., 2010; Weisburd et al., 2014).
Framing the Police Education-Crime Nexus
Together, human capital and deterrence perspectives provide theoretical justification
for studying the mediating effects of arrest productivity on the association between education
policy and offending. This joint framework suggests that agencies with a college requirement
should be more effective at preventing crime. Research indicates that law enforcement’s ability
to apprehend lawbreakers impacts citizens’ perceptions of arrest risk that are integral to crime
deterrence. Thus, we predict that increased police arrest productivity, informed by education
policy—a proxy for agency educational composition, disincentivizes crime and therefore,
reduces offending.
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Prior Research
Police Education Policy and Crime
Despite numerous commentators contending college requirements for officers are
fundamental to improving police effectiveness against crime, this link has received limited
scholarly coverage. We located just two published studies exploring this relationship, with each
returning different results. In the first study, MacDonald (2002) used 1993 and 1997 LEMAS
data in a pooled cross-sectional analysis of city-level robbery and homicide rates across two
periods (1993-1994 and 1997-1998). His findings showed that while agency education policy
exerted minimal effects on homicide rates, an associated 10% decrease in robbery rates for
departments with a college requirement was observed.
Over a decade later, Sozer and Merlo (2013) turned to 2003 LEMAS data to examine the
effects of community policing on violent crime and property crime. Using a series of regression
models, the authors reported negligible educational effects for both small and large agencies.
Interestingly, whereas a non-significant positive leaning relationship between education policy
indicators and property crime was seen across all agencies, for violent crime, this association
leaned negative in smaller agencies and positive in larger ones.
These authors, as well as the others cited in this section, failed to discuss education
findings thoughtfully. We reason that the periphery focus on education and the equivocal state
of the literature precluded them from doing so. Nonetheless, these findings underscore the
need for more detailed analysis of a national sample. Both studies also focused on the direct
effects of education policy, overlooking potential mediators that may partially explain the
mixed findings. Based on our theoretical rationale, we expect that agencies requiring some
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college experience for new officers will generate more arrests than those without such a
policy.
Police Education Policy and Arrest Rates
In the few published accounts of education’s effects on city arrest rates, mostly null
effects have been reported. Except for Doerner and Doerner’s (2012) analysis of Florida police
agencies, wherein an insignificant inverse association was found between education
requirements and property crime clearances, and a positive relationship with violent crime
clearances, most research in this area tends to be cross-sectional, multijurisdictional, and based
on older data (Chappell et al., 2006; Eitle, 2005; Eitle et al., 2005; Tillyer, 2018). Eitle and
colleagues, for instance, published two papers in 2005 using 2000 LEMAS and National IncidentBased Reporting System (NIBRS) data. Eitle et al.’s (2005) multilevel analysis of arrest
probabilities for simple assault and aggravated assault across 105 cities yielded mixed results.
Whereas educational minimums (i.e., 1 = no requirement to 5 = 4-year college degree) did not
appreciably influence aggravated assault arrests, they observed a .17 increase in the probability
of simple assault arrests per education level. Contending that more educated police forces may
be relatively younger, they considered this positive association to be suggestive of greater
formalism in better-educated departments that limit discretion. However, this explanation fails
to square with their reported findings, as arrest decisions for simple assault are likely more
discretionary than for felony assault. Moreover, using the same sample and methodology,
Eitle’s (2005) analysis of education policy effects on domestic violence arrests across U.S. cities
found no significant effects.
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Next, using 1997 LEMAS data, Chappell and colleagues’ (2006) nationwide study of city
agencies detected a statistically insignificant inverse association between departmental
education minimums and arrest rates for both overall and violent crime. Lastly, Tillyer (2018)
conducted the most recent LEMAS study in this area. In investigating community policing’s
impact on arrests for kidnapping, robbery, and violent index offenses across large agencies, he
transformed education policy information from the 2007 LEMAS data into a series of
dichotomous control variables capturing agencies’ minimum education requirements (i.e., high
school, some college, two-year degree, four-year degree, or no educational requirement).
Again, like the other studies cited here, education policy was not predictive of arrest.
While the crime control literature indicates that departmental education requirements
are not significantly associated with felony arrest rates, scholars report increased productivity
among college-educated officers in the form of more stops, searches, and general arrests
(Glasglow, Green, and Knowles, 1973; Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker, 2012; Rosenfeld et al.,
2020). We are mindful of the ecological fallacy of inferring macro-level processes from
individual-level relationships (Robinson, 1950); yet, the lack of comparable studies places us in
mostly uncharted empirical waters. However, we draw on insights from individual-level
evidence to better understand how HCT may apply in police contexts. Based on our theoretical
rationale, we expect that agencies requiring some college experience for new officers will
generate more arrests than those without such a policy.
The Present Study
Our review of the literature failed to locate a single focal analysis of the education
policy-crime control association. Any insight into the effects of education policy on crime come
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from studies in which education policy was not the primary intervention of interest. Thus, the
literature suffers from three related shortcomings. First, the theory remains underdeveloped,
making past predictions about this relationship speculative. Second, the lack of focus on
education policy indicators has left endogeneity issues unattended. Given the reliance on
observational data and correlational methods, prior research has not rigorously addressed
selection bias. Third, potential mediating factors underlying this association have gone
unexplored. The theoretical perspective outlined above posits that department education
policy effects on crime may not only be direct but may also operate through police arrest
productivity.
We address these limitations to advance the literature. The novelty of this study is the
theoretical grounding and the evaluation of the mediating influence of police arrest rates or
arrest productivity on the crime-suppressing effects of departmental education requirements.
Drawing on a national sample of 1,543 U.S. cities, we employ a recently developed entropy
weighted mediation approach that accounts for selection on education policy and the
subsequent mediator to minimize endogeneity bias. Our underlying theoretical framework
predicts that productivity mediates the effect of education policy on crime rates.
Methods
Data
We collated data from multiple sources. First, to account for police education policies
and other agency measures, we draw on the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) 2013 Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data that contain information
about agency personnel, expenditures, operations, equipment, computers and information
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systems, and written policies from 2013. We use 2013 data because it represents the most
recent wave of available LEMAS data. While LEMAS 2013 does not provide information on the
number of college-educated officers in a department, the dataset reports education policy
indicators not available in other data sources.
Next, to control for city-level factors such as socioeconomic conditions and racial
composition, we employ data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS)
5-year (2009-2013) estimates for principal cities of metropolitan or micropolitan statistical
areas data files. Finally, crime and arrest data come from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR)
Offenses Known to Law Enforcement, Clearance, and Persons Arrested data for 2013 and 2014.
UCR data provide counts of offenses and arrest by crime categories and includes information
about the reporting agency.
Both LEMAS and UCR data report a unique agency identifier or Originating Agency
Identifier (ORI) code. Using BJS’s 2012 Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk file that
associates each agency’s ORI code with a Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code
indicating state, county, and jurisdiction location, we matched the ORI and FIPS code to merge
LEMAS and UCR data with ACS data. Initial merging of the UCR and LEMAS data matched on
1,998 city agencies. After combining these two data sources with ACS data and removing
observations with missing data, our analytic sample consisted of 1,543 municipal law
enforcement agencies.
Outcome Measures
We assessed the effects of education policy on crime control using six dependent
variables: homicide, personal robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, theft, and motor vehicle
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theft rates per 100,000 city residents.10 Whereas the 2013 LEMAS and UCR arrest data,
respectively, provide our education policy and police arrest productivity measures (see below),
we use the 2014 UCR crime data for the outcomes. This approach was taken for three reasons.
For one, lagged education policy effects are plausible since police arrest productivity could take
some time to influence the apprehension risk perceptions of residents (see, e.g., Corman and
Mocan, 2000; Mustard, 2003). This variable sequence also accounts for the simultaneous
relationship between arrest rates and crime rates (Greenberg, Kessler, and Logan, 1979;
Rosenfeld and Wallman, 2019). Finally, although we do not resolve all temporal questions, this
approach attempts to temporally order the education policy/arrest productivity/crime
association.
Education Policy Indicators
We identify the effects of departments’ educational requirement using the binary focal
measure, education minimum (1 = some college or higher) (“What was your agency’s minimum
educational requirement for sworn new hires?”).
Mediating Variables
Considering perceptions of police arrest productivity can appreciably impact offender
decision-making (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017; Levitt, 1998; Owens, 2013), we examine the
mediating effects of city-level violent crime and property crime arrest rates.11 Violent and
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We omitted rape offenses because of well‐documented reporting and recording issues regarding rapes.
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This measurement decision is somewhat arbitrary and arises out of modeling concerns. The treatment-

effect/mediation analytic framework we employ cannot handle a continuous mediator since the statistical theory
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property crime arrest rates are calculated as the respective arrest rate per 100,000 residents
for violent offenses (homicide, aggravated assault, robbery) and property offenses (burglary,
larceny, motor vehicle theft) in 2013. Both measures were dichotomized by a median split to
categorize departments as having high or low arrest productivity. While offenders tend not to
specialize in a crime type (e.g., only aggravated assault), some evidence indicates that they can
be broadly categorized as either property or violent offenders. To better tap the deterrence
effects of arrests, the violent crime and property crime arrest indicators serve as mediators in
our violent and property crime models, respectively.
Contextual Measures
In addition to the education policy measures, we incorporate controls for other relevant
departmental and structural factors found to be important in prior research (Braga, 2015;
Chappell et al., 2006; Land et al., 1990; Levitt, 2002; Lockwood, 2014; Lum et al., 2017;
Maguire, 1997; McCall et al., 2010; Pratt and Cullen, 2005; Rosenfeld and Wallman, 2019;
Tillyer, 2018).
Police agency measures
Measures for percent nonwhite officers, as well as percent female officers, control for
the effects of a department’s racial and gender composition. Police strength, a proxy for police
resources and response capacity (Levitt, 2002; Tillyer, 2018), is measured as the number of
sworn police personnel per 100,000 residents. The measure, administrative density, or the

and implementation in Stata is underdeveloped. Accordingly, we dichotomize the mediator as needed for the
model estimation.
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number of full-time nonsworn staff per 100,000 residents, taps the level of administrative
support available (Maguire, 1997). Investigative capacity and patrol capacity are
operationalized, respectively, as the percentage of officers assigned to investigative duties and
patrol duties. We calculated fiscal capacity as law enforcement expenditures per capita (total
yearly police department expenditures divided by the number of residents) to measure
agencies’ ability to pay employees and resource capacity (Briggs et al., 2008).
We incorporate an additional agency control for the effects of community policing
strategies on crime and arrest rates (Chappell et al., 2006; Litwin, 2004; Lum et al., 2017;
Roberts, 2008; Tillyer, 2018). To account for these strategies, we adapt the summary construct,
community-oriented activity, from Tillyer (2018) and Shjarback and White (2016). This measure
consists of five LEMAS items with binary responses (1 = yes) indicating whether agencies: 1)
actively encouraged patrol officers to engage in SARA-type problem-solving projects on their
beats; 2) included collaborative problem-solving projects in the evaluation criteria of patrol
officers; 3) regularly assigned the same patrol officers’ primary responsibility for a particular
area or beat within your agency’s jurisdiction; 4) had a problem-solving partnership or written
agreement with any local civic, business, or governmental organizations; and 5) conducted a
community survey on fear of crime and police satisfaction. Higher values correspond with
greater engagement in community policing (α = 0.62).
Structural measures
As Wellford and Cronin (1999) point out, factors beyond police control like economic
deprivation, family disruption, and racial segregation influence both crime and the police’s
ability to apprehend felony offenders. The next group of predictors reflect jurisdiction-level
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population, economic, and demographic characteristics drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
American Community Survey (ACS) data files. Population, which identifies the count of
residents in a jurisdiction, is logged because of its highly skewed distribution. Percent nonwhite
residents indicates the percent of minority residents, and percent immigrant residents
represents the percent of foreign-born residents. The percent of renter-occupied housing
represents residential instability, and we operationalized educational attainment as the percent
of adults with a bachelor’s degree. The economic disadvantage measure is derived from an
exploratory factor analysis of 7 candidate items using promax rotation. With higher values
reflective of greater economic deprivation in cities, this measure loaded high on city poverty
rate (.919), percent of households receiving public assistance (.900) median household income
(–.763), percent female headed households with young children (.727), and city unemployment
rate (.686) (total explained variance = 94%). Scree plot of eigenvalues (see Figure C3.1), KaiserMeyer-Olkin value (KMO = .83), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p = .000) verified that factor
analysis was applied appropriately.
Analytical Strategy
In this section, we detail our empirical approach and the treatment of missing data.
Deterministic imputation was used to replace missing data with values predicted in a regression
model. We perform an entropy weighted mediation analysis to identify two primary estimates.
First, the total effect quantifies the overall influence of police education policy on city crime
rates. Second, mediating effect quantifies the proportion of the total effect transmitted
through a police arrest productivity indicator.

89

Missing Data
Arrest information for homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault offenses was missing
on 175 observations. Rather than discard a large number of observations due to missingness on
three variables, we applied deterministic imputation to substitute missing data prior to
operationalizing the arrest mediator (White and Thompson, 2005). Deterministic imputation
procedures were selected because our analytical procedures do not accommodate multiply
imputed datasets. We utilized all measures described below, and the imputed values replaced
the missing arrest data (Graham, 2009). Similar outcomes were observed when we conducted
complete case analysis as a robustness check (data not shown). We checked the models for
multicollinearity and tolerance values (1/VIF) suggested no multicollinearity issues (average
variance inflation factors [VIF] = 1.8). All analyses were conducted with Stata 15.1.
Entropy Balancing
Policy adoption does not happen randomly. Policy implementation is purposive, goaloriented, and changes over time (Béland et al., 2016; Monroe, 1998). In law enforcement,
economic, organizational, political, and geographic factors might influence which departments
establish college education requirements. For example, some police chiefs believe that a
degree requirement would drastically reduce an already shrinking applicant pool (Gardiner,
2017), making higher education requirements less appealing for understaffed or budgetstrapped departments. Thus, failure to account for the endogeneity on education policy
indicators may lead to biased estimates since other features could influence this association.
In this study, departments requiring a college background make up the treatment
group, and those not requiring college comprise the control group. To eliminate statistical
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differences in observed covariates between these groups, we used an alternative weighting
method known as entropy balancing. Developed by Hainmueller (2012), the entropy-balancing
algorithm provides an optimal weighting solution to balance covariate distributions in
observational studies with binary treatments. This process reweights the data from the control
group’s observations to match the moments (e.g., means, variances, and skewness) computed
from the treated observations’ data.
Like propensity score methods, entropy balancing aims to achieve statistical equivalence
among comparison groups. The principal advantage of this approach over propensity score
strategies is that entropy balancing directly calculates weights to adjust for known sample
distributions, integrating covariate balance into the weights to equalize the distribution
moments for education policy predictors among comparison samples. This approach ensures
that the comparison groups match each other exactly on specified moments (Hainmueller,
2012).12
To guard against potential selection bias and improve confidence in the ignorability
assumption (see below), we condition the analysis on a rich set of empirically informed
covariates. Prior research provides an indication of relevant factors for the outcomes, but we
are less certain about the factors that would balance the treatment. However, our choice of
variables for the balancing equation was guided by a combination of police compensation
studies, human resources literature, and organizational theory (Donaldson, 2002; Eitle et al.,
2005; Giblin and Galli, 2017; Zhao et al., 2010). Using Poisson and logistic regression analysis to

12

The mean is the first moment, variance is the second moment, and skewness is the third moment.
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determine the respective predictors of the outcomes and treatment, we identified a
parsimonious and robust set of pretreatment measures that include: percent non-white
officers, percent female officers, police strength, administrative density, investigative capacity,
patrol capacity, fiscal capacity, population, percent nonwhite, percent immigrant residents,
residential stability, educational attainment, and economic disadvantage. All measures are
predictive of the outcomes and except for three measures (investigative capacity, patrol
capacity, educational attainment, and economic disadvantage), they are also significantly
related to the treatment. We balanced samples on the first moment. Table C3.1 shows that
after weighting, the mean differences between the comparison samples were reduced to zero.
The entropy weights were then included as weights in the subsequent mediation model
estimation.
Mediation Analysis
After obtaining the weights, we conducted a formal mediation analysis to decompose
the total effect or average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of agency education policy on
subsequent crime rates into two separate effects: 1) natural indirect effect representing an
arrest-mediated mechanism, and 2) natural direct effect representing all other potential
mechanisms. Specifically, we implement a ratio‐of‐mediator‐probability weighting (RMPW)
method of mediation analysis introduced by Hong (2010). The RMPW approach estimates the
natural indirect and direct effects through mean contrasts between estimated effects of college
education requirements and the counterfactual condition of no requirement.
We consider these effects “natural” rather than “controlled” because the mediators can
take random values, under each policy condition, that vary naturally across agencies rather
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than taking fixed values controlled by analysts (Pearl, 2001). Unlike traditional mediation
methods, the RMPW approach estimates the conditional probability of each mediator value
under each treatment condition as a function of covariate values to explicitly define the direct
and indirect effects. Thus, this estimator produces more reliable findings than conventional
methods (Hong et al., 2015).
Let X, T, M, and Y denote covariates, treatment indicator, mediator, and outcome,
respectively. The counterfactual direct and indirect effects are defined as the expected
difference between two potential outcomes for education policy adopters and non-adopters:
E(YT,M(T) – YT*,M(T*)); where YT,M(T) signifies what a city’s crime rates (Y) would be given two
conditions: 1) the agency educational minimum (T = 1 for college requirement, 0 for no
requirement); and 2) the “natural” high arrest rate jurisdictions versus those with low arrest
rates under the same assigned education policy condition (M(T)). In short, the natural direct
effect estimates the impact of a college requirement on lagged city crime rates if college
education policy did not influence city arrest rates [E(Y1,M(0) – Y0,M(0))]. The natural indirect effect
estimates the impact of a college requirement on lagged crime rates as mediated by arrest
rates [E(Y1,M(1) – Y1,M(0))].
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The mediation model is depicted graphically in Figure 3.1. Education policy influences
arrest productivity (a) which in turn influences city crime rates (b); education policy may also
Figure 3.1. The relationship between departmental education policy (EP),
arrest productivity (AP), and crime rate (CR)

AP

a

b
c'

EP

CR

affect subsequent crime either directly or through unobserved alternative mechanisms (c'). The
statistical model representing the graph in Figure 3.1 has a linear equation for the crime
outcome and a logistic equation for the arrest mediator, which we dichotomized into low and
high rates to accommodate modeling constraints.
The key identifying assumption is the sequential ignorability assumption which
expresses that, for t, t′ = 0, 1; m ∈ M,
{Yi (t, m), Yi (t′, m), Mi (t), Mi (t′)} ╨ Ti | Xi
Yi (t, m), ╨ {Mi (t), Mi (t′)} | Ti = t, Xi.
This assumption holds that within levels of the observed covariates, treatment status and the
mediator value under each treatment condition is as “good as random” (Hong et al., 2015).
Findings
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the study variables. The sample of 1,543 cities
averaged 3.9 homicides, 82.4 robberies, 218.6 aggravated assaults, 555.3 burglaries, 2,074.1
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thefts, and 179.9 motor vehicle thefts per 100,000 residents in 2014. Regarding officer
demographics, a minority of agencies required some college education (16.9%), female officers
made up a small fraction of sworn personnel (8.6%), and the mean representation of non-white
officers was modest (15.5%). Other contextual factors indicate nearly a quarter of all city
residents were non-white (24%) and roughly 5%, on average, were college graduates.
Table 3.2 presents the results of the mediation analysis performed to isolate the direct
and indirect effects of departmental education policy on violent crime. Several conditions are
necessary to establish a mediation model (Baron and Kenny, 1986). First, the association
between the predictor and the outcome variable must be statistically significant. Second, the
mediator must share a significant relationship with both the predictor and the outcome
variable. Finally, the mediating variable must significantly reduce the association between the
predictor and the outcome variable.
For violent crime, Table 3.2 shows a significant total effect of education policy on
aggravated assaults only. The overall effect or ATT indicates that all else equal, cities requiring a
college background for officers experienced 22 fewer aggravated assaults per 100,000
residents. We then decomposed the ATT of education policy into direct and indirect effects.
The findings indicate that while violent crime arrest indicators do not significantly mediate the
impact of education policy on the three violent crime outcomes, including aggravated assaults,
the direct effect on aggravated assault rates are negative and sizeable. Since a college
requirement is directly associated with a reduction of 19 aggravated assaults per 100,000, the
ATT is primarily driven by the direct effect. Albeit insignificant, indirect effects were also
negative, resulting in an overall effect in the same direction.
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Table 3.3 shows the property crime models. Except for burglary offenses, the ATT of
education policy did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. For burglaries, the
total effect indicates that if all agencies adopted a college requirement, cities could expect an
associated 46 fewer burglaries per 100,000 residents. When examining the mediating influence
of police arrest productivity, non-significant direct and indirect effects were observed across all
offenses. Albeit insignificant, while direct effects are larger than the indirect effects, both
effects work in the same direction to produce an overall significant negative effect.
Discussion
Since the early 1900s, various national commissions and academics have maintained
that increased education standards for law enforcement could improve public safety. Yet, the
research on police education requirements and crime control indicates otherwise. However,
what we know about this association comes from studies in which education policy indicators
are not focal. Thus, prior studies did not address theoretical and methodological challenges
specific to the study of agency education minimums and crime. Beyond the underdevelopment
of theory, the inherent endogeneity of education policy has gone unaddressed, raising
questions about the accuracy of past results. Moreover, potential mediators that transmit the
effects of education policy have gone unexplored, despite the theoretical indication that such
policies might, directly and indirectly, influence crime through its impact on police productivity.
Using national data on 1,543 city police agencies, we implement a novel entropy
balanced ratio-of-mediator probability mediation weighting analysis to decompose the direct
and indirect effects of departmental education requirements on city crime rates. We did not
find statistically significant mediating effects of arrest for either violent or property crimes. Yet,
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regardless of the statistical significance, ATT estimates mostly aligned with our expectations
(except for robbery and theft which leaned positive).
For violent crime, we found that a college requirement negligibly influenced homicide
and robbery rates, but significantly impacted aggravated assaults. Cities with a college policy for
police experienced 22 fewer aggravated assaults per 100,000 residents relative to those
without this requirement. For property crime, we detected significant negative total and direct
effects of education policy on burglaries. Overall, establishing a college requirement for new
officers is associated with a decrease of nearly 46 burglaries per 100,000 city residents. These
effects appear promising, but only one previous study allows for empirical comparisons withour
findings. MacDonald (2002) performed regression analyses that returned much smaller
treatment effect sizes for robbery offenses, while the magnitude of education policy’s effect on
homicides in both studies was close in magnitude. Like the current study, MacDonald reported
an insignificant association with robbery offenses that leaned positive for robbery and negative
for homicide offenses.
Deciphering how agency education requirements contribute to lower crime rates
without increasing arrest rates is both perplexing and intriguing. Adding to this challenge, no
similar evaluations exist to compare our findings against. Up to this point, we, like many other
stakeholders, naturally associated police effectiveness with increased arrests. However, our
findings suggest the need to revisit standing definitions of police effectiveness, as we found
that departments adopting a college policy can unsurprisingly affect crime through means other
than arrest.
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Recent studies have supported the use of alternative crime interventions. Though not
directly examined here, several works show that “guardian actions” or less punitive and
informal police activity strongly contributes to crime prevention. Nagin and colleagues (2015)
described such an approach as the sentinel role of police, which has found support in recent
research. For instance, in an experimental study, Ariel and colleagues (2016) placed uniformed
civilian police staff in crime hot spots. “Soft patrol,” as termed by the authors, was associated
with 39% less crime and 20% fewer service calls in target areas than control areas. This finding
would suggest that crime reduction is not contingent on punitive enforcement strategies.
Further, a meta-analysis of Broken Windows interventions demonstrated that community and
problem-solving interventions exhibited the largest program effect sizes (Braga et al., 2015).
Most recently, Piza (2018) analyzed data from the Operation Impact foot patrol
experiment data in Newark, New Jersey. His findings revealed an associated 51% decreased
likelihood of violent crime during the operational period (6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.) and 52%
decrease in the daily probability of robbery occurring for every 1-unit increase in guardian
actions (e.g., citizen contacts, business checks, bus checks, and taxi inspections). Such research
findings suggest that informal community engagement and less invasive police contacts may
matter as much as traditional law enforcement activities.
Thus, considering the characteristics attributed to college-educated officers (e.g., better
communication, de-escalation, and problem-solving skills), departments mandating more
education may operate differently. It appears that these agencies might emphasize
enforcement strategies that effectively prevent crime without subjecting communities to overenforcement. This type of approach would maximize their attributes and is particularly salient
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for minority communities disparately affected by aggressive enforcement activities (Kochel and
Weisburd, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). While we did not examine differences in
enforcement practices between departments with and without a college requirement,
descriptive statistics show that the mean value for our community-oriented activity measure
was 25% higher for agencies with a college requirement. Police studies find that community
engagement influences offending levels through the development of effective partnerships
with residents that lead to increased crime reporting and citizen cooperation with police
investigations (Litwin, 2004; Roberts, 2008). This increased trust and willingness of citizens to
come forward about crime could possibly explain the positive effects of education policy on
robberies and thefts. Future research should consider the interaction effects of police
education policy and various crime control strategies such as community policing.
Despite employing a robust entropy weighting mediation approach, study limitations
prevent a full endorsement of college requirements for police. Most prominently, our approach
does not account for unobserved factors. For example, violent offending and arrest rates have
steadily declined since 2000 (Sabol et al., 2019). The study data were also collected during a
period of intense criminal justice reform (Sabol and Bauman, 2020). Thus, readers should
interpret our findings with caution, as we recognize that our results could partially reflect these
secular factors. While we are confident our findings accurately characterize the association
between education policy and crime prevention, the possibility remains that unobserved forces
inform this relationship. Therefore, despite the difficulty of finding a credible instrumental
variable (IV), to generate more robust knowledge in this area, future studies should endeavor
to examine this relationship across time using an IV approach.
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Our study could also be improved in other ways. First, the outcome measures in our
analyses represent the total rate for crime types, which include crimes regardless of the
circumstances. It is unclear whether we should expect education policy to impact gang killings,
for example, the same as the rate of homicides resulting from domestic violence. Future
research should examine the effects of departmental education policy on violent offenses
broken out by the circumstances surrounding the crime.
Our inability to detect mediating effects could flow from measurement or data
constraints. We used two binary indicators rather than continuous measures as mediating
variables in our two sets of analyses. By dichotomizing our mediators, we may have sacrificed
statistical variation in outcomes between groups (Altman and Royston, 2006). However, this is
the first mediation study is this subfield. Considering the lack of empirical precedence, we relied
on theoretical insight and the available data. That said, it is possible that our data or
measurement approach simply could not surface this association. In particularly, given that the
theft and motor vehicle theft models, while insignificant, show sizable and offsetting indirect
effects, future studies examining various data sources should replicate this study using
continuous mediators.
Another limitation concerns the unit of analysis used in the study. Cities are composed
of neighborhoods with varying crime rates, arrest rates, and socioeconomic conditions
(Peterson and Krivo, 2010; Krivo et al., 2009). Therefore, a city-level analysis might mask the
more nuanced effects of police education policy. Data sparseness would most likely complexify
things, yet future research based on neighborhood and other sub-city areas could help detect
more localized associations.
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Finally, we use educational minimums as a proxy for the educational composition of
police departments. Ideally, we would directly examine the impact of the total number of
college-educated officers in agencies on crime control. Unfortunately, such measures for
nationally representative sample are not currently available, pointing to the need for more
detailed data on officer education, including information on college major and whether college
credentials were earned before or after joining the police force.
Conclusion
Based on our estimates, departments with college requirements apparently can affect
reported crime in a manner that relies on strategies other than arrest. We reason that agencies
with a college requirement may have transitioned from “enforcer” philosophies that emphasize
punitiveness to the “sentinel” philosophies that “promote crime reduction while building public
trust for police officers” (Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015, p. 1). Despite some
evidence in favor of the crime control effects of education policy, nuances remain that require
consideration. Specifically, because our research design only accounts for measured factors,
unobserved forces may influence this association. This restriction makes it difficult to parse out
whether education policy or other secular forces such as local reform efforts or civic leadership
changes are the cause. Either way, our findings indicate there is something both promising and
different about law enforcement operations in cities with a college requirement for police
personnel.
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Discussion
More education for America’s police forces represents a perennial theme in police

reform efforts. However, our understanding of higher education’s influence on police
performance is not fully developed for three primary reasons. For one, previous studies have
left endogeneity issues unattended. Along with omitting important factors like officer work
attitudes and ecological measures, prior studies potentially suffer from selectivity issues that
might bias estimates. Another reason is the literature’s atheoretical nature, as conventional
wisdom has dominated explanations of how a college education influences police behavior.
Lastly, empirical accounts on educational attainment have focused solely on direct effects,
giving little attention to the indirect impacts and the mechanisms through which education
effects are expressed.
Filling these research gaps is of both public and government interest. In terms of public
interest, high levels of crime, misconduct, and use of force incidents threaten both police
legitimacy and public confidence in the police (Roberts and Lyons, 2011; Tankebe, 2013). For
city leaders, if highly educated officers contribute only marginally more to department
performance than less educated officers do, then the higher costs of staffing college-educated
officers (e.g., increased salaries, education incentive pay, and tuition reimbursement) may not
be fiscally responsible.
This dissertation addressed the noted challenges to examine the effects of educational
capital on three of the most salient police outcomes: police-citizen violence, police misconduct,
and crime control. Rather than assessing a single unit of analysis, this study considers the
impacts of higher education at the officer-, agency-, and city-levels across time and place to
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extend the public safety literature in three ways. First, we employed robust methods new to
this subfield to guard against endogeneity problems. Second, we applied interdisciplinary
perspectives on moral development, organizational climate, human capital, and deterrence to
bolster the theory in this area. Third, unlike prior research, this study examines both the overall
influence of education and the mechanisms that might transmit its effects.
Although we find partial support for our hypotheses, three main takeaways from this
dissertation set the stage for research and policy development. First, the effects of education
on police-citizen violence are more likely to emerge during signatory events like police
shootings than more frequent occurrences such as suspect resistance and physical altercations
during arrests. This finding could, in part reflect critical reasoning skills found among college
graduates that sharpen college-educated officers’ foresight and discernment (Bebeau and
Thoma, 2003; Facione, 2009; Halpern, 1998; Helsdingen et al., 2011; King and Mayhew, 2002;
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991). In policing, these attributes bode well for officers, affording
them keener awareness of the surrounding environment and specific cue recognition skills.
While some violent police encounters are beyond the control of officers, those possessing these
attributes tend to avert situations where potential deadly force usage is likely through more
measured interactions with the public (Fyfe, 1986; Klinger et al., 2016).
The second major takeaway is that college-educated officers are not a panacea for
police misconduct. Following the recent spate of high-profile killings of unarmed black citizens
by white officers, hiring more college-educated officers has once again been positioned as
foundational to ethical police behavior (see, e.g., Bouffard and Armstrong, 2020). Our findings
indicate that more research is required on this front. For instance, our police misconduct study
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shows that policies focused solely on officer education will not reduce misconduct. In fact,
doing so might even make matters worse, at least in larger jurisdictions. Our findings indicate
that the most educated big-city departments generate significantly higher misconduct and
abuse of authority complaint rates than the least educated departments. We believe this
indication reflects the higher levels of police cynicism and job discontentment among collegeeducated officers flowing from a misalignment of qualifications and work duties. Scholars find
that officers tend to become cynical of the job and the public when departments are resistant
to changing their operations to match the attributes of their sworn personnel (Miller and Fry,
1976; Trojanowicz and Nicholson, 1976; Griffin et al., 1978). Such a mismatch might cause the
most educated officers to become cynical and, in turn, increase their risk for engaging in
misconduct (Muir, 1977; Skolnick, 2002; Worden, 1996).
The final takeaway concerns the association between agency educational requirements
and crime control. A longstanding question in law enforcement is how police can improve
public safety without infringing upon the rights of citizens. We found that departments with a
college requirement are able to significantly impact felony crime rates without relying on arrest
to control offending. Though not directly examined in this dissertation, we conclude that these
agencies rely on “guardian actions” or less punitive and informal police activity to prevent
crime.
Despite this dissertation’s contributions, there remains room for improvement. First, we
drew on cross-sectional data owing mostly to the absence of comprehensive police data
options. Although the LEMAS data used in Chapter 3 are available across multiple waves
spanning 1987 to 2013, several education policy indicators and key covariates were not
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consistently measured throughout this period. Further, only about 200 large city departments
provided data for all waves, limiting our ability to examine the full spectrum of U.S. law
enforcement agencies.
While our cross-sectional analysis provided nuanced insights into the effects of
education in policing such data do not indicate the sequence of events. Thus, causal inference is
precluded because we cannot determine whether educational capital improvements occurred
before, after, or during the outcome’s onset. Moving to a longitudinal setting does not
guarantee unbiased estimates as endogeneity problems, including simultaneity, remain a threat
to the findings’ accuracy (Wooldridge, 2002). Instrumental variables estimation represents a
potential solution to this problem. A valid IV is related to the treatment, only influences the
outcome through its effect on the treatment, and shares no common cause with the outcome
(Baiocchi et al., 2014). Thus, in principle, IV techniques can mitigate potential bias due to the
inherent endogeneity of educational achievement.
To extend this research, we present two candidate instruments worth consideration.
Since it is conceivable that intense public scrutiny or external regulation spurred by a pattern or
practice of police misconduct could result in departments adopting a college education
requirement, indicators signifying whether agencies experienced either circumstance warrants
IV testing. Another candidate instrument is the educational attainment level of the jurisdiction
served as we expect departments establish educational requirements congruent with the
educational composition of their communities.
Another approach for estimating the potential bidirectional relationship between police
education policy and outcomes (e.g., crime rates) is dynamic simultaneous-equation modeling.
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This method adjusts for bias caused by the dynamic correlation between outcomes and
predictors by transforming data in first differences to account for the link between the lagged
endogenous regressor and the error term (Wintoki et al., 2012).
Higher education and the Future of Policing
The police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor were the proverbial "straw that
broke our nation's back," leading to mass protests and public demands for systemic reform in
law enforcement. Among many other recommendations, including defunding and abolishing
the police, part of the new vision for law enforcement includes college-educated police forces.
The optimistic assumption is that police departments composed of officers who have “certain
qualities (motivation, self-discipline, general intelligence) … and certain characteristics (civility,
urbanity, self-control)” (Wilson, 1969, p. 73) will be able to effectively tackle crime in a
procedurally just manner. Other commentators have added that augmenting an agency’s
educational commitment has the power to transform its culture and practices. For instance,
Murphy (1989) notes that:
In general, a police department that has had a four-year college degree as an entry
requirement for ten years or more can be quite a different organization from one
requiring only a high school diploma. More responsibility can be placed on the officers,
and a more collegial style of management can be utilized. The college-educated force
sets higher professional standards and goals, which in turn, command public respect
and help shape public opinion. Finally, a college-educated police force has the potential
to proactively, rather than just reactively, address the crime and drug problems that
plague society today. (p. iv)
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We caution, however, that hiring more college-educated officers is not enough. As
evidenced by our findings on police-citizen violence and misconduct, education alone will not
solve the problems in policing. Raising the educational standards for police is only a first step. A
college education may indeed make officers more receptive to new ideas. However, under the
traditional regime of policing that emphasizes punitiveness, college-educated officers'
ambitious disposition, high productivity, and policy-compliant nature could lead to more
misconduct complaints and situations where the use of force is necessary.
Americans must reconceptualize the role of law enforcement and make financial and
policy investments to turn the idea into reality. To transform the police mission from that of
warrior to guardian, law enforcement must move beyond traditional metrics like arrests,
citations, and seizures. Instead, departments should incentivize and reward officers in a way
that promotes a new style of policing. Since college-educated officers tend to favor community
policing over conventional practices (Chappell and Gibson, 2009; Gau and Paul, 2019), we
believe that these officers would thrive in a system that encourages innovation, as well as more
community- and problem-centered police services. Not necessarily because they are inherently
more community-oriented than their less-educated colleagues but because they "adhere more
closely to departmental policies and procedures in the hope of furthering their careers"
(Rosenfeld et al., 2020, p. 229). If these officers adhere to their new role and duties as diligently
as they have traditional operations, as our findings suggest, they will be able to provide
residents security and protection without subjecting them to invasive police practices.
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Appendix A
Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables (N = 1,104)
Variable

M/Percent

SD

Range

Percent
imputed

Dependent Variables
Police Shooting

.26

-

0-1

1.00

Violent Arrest

.90

-

0-1

1.36

Citizen Altercation

.78

-

0-1

1.99

1-3

0.91

Treatment
Educational Attainment
High School

.15

-

-

-

Some College

.55

-

-

-

Bachelor’s Degree

.30

-

-

-

Covariates
Tenure

11.52

9.32

0-44

3.99

Age

36.06

9.09

20-66

2.08

High Ranked

.31

-

0-1

0.36

Citizen Contact

.73

-

0-1

2.72

Veteran Status

.35

-

0-1

0.27

Married

.60

-

0-1

0.45

Male

.86

-

0-1

0.36

Non-White

.36

-

0-1

1.09

Investigated

.65

-

0-1

1.09

Job Stress

1.97

.54

1.14-5.16

11.05

Job Contentment

4.78

.99

1.18-7.22

11.05

Organizational Fairness

1.67

.82

-.16-4.05

11.05
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Table 1.2. Effects of College Education on Police Shootings, Violent Arrests, and Citizen Altercations a
Panel A
(unweighted)
Police Shootings

Violent Arrest

Citizen Altercations

(N = 1,104)

(N = 1,104)

(N = 1,104)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Education level
Some College

-0.05 (0.02)

0.02, -0.08

0.01 (0.01)

0.00, 0.03

0.01 (0.03)

-0.02, 0.04

College Degree

-0.06 (0.02)

0.03, -0.08

0.02 (0.01)*

0.00, 0.04

0.05 (0.03)

-0.02, 0.03

Panel B
(weighted)
Police Shootings

Violent Arrest

Citizen Altercations

(N = 1,104)

(N = 1,104)

(N = 1,104)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Education level
Some College

-0.07 (0.04)

-0.14, -0.01

0.02 (0.02)

-0.02, 0.06

0.01 (0.04)

-0.06, 0.08

College Degree

-0.10 (0.04)*

-0.18, -0.01

0.03 (0.03)

-0.02, 0.08

0.05 (0.04)

-0.02, 0.13

Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01 ***p < .001
a
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure A1.1. Scree plot showing eigen values by factors
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Figure A1.2. Density Plots for Control and Treated Samples
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Figure A1.2. Density Plots for Control and Treated Samples (cont.)
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Table A1.1. Polychoric factor analysis with promax rotation (three factors)
Factor Structure
Item

Job
stress

1. Feeling hopeless about the future

0.7781

2. Spells of terror or panic

0.7573

3. Feeling so restless you couldn’t sit still

0.7479

4. Crying easily

0.7298

5. Feeling that something bad was going to
happen to you at work
6. I feel tired at work even with adequate
sleep
7. I am moody, irritable, or impatient over
small problems
8. I want to withdraw from the constant
demands on my time and energy from
work
9. I feel negative, futile or depressed about
work
10. I think that I am not as efficient at work as
I should be
11. I feel physically, emotionally and
spiritually depleted.
12. My resistance to illness is lowered
because of my work
13. My interest in doing fun activities is
lowered because of my work
14. I feel uncaring about the problems and
needs of the public
15. I have difficulty concentrating on my job
16. When I ask myself why I get up and go to
work, the only answer that occurs to me is
“I have to”
17. I view my work as just a job - it is not a
career
18. It is likely I will look for another full-time
job outside this department within the
next year

Job
contentment

0.6718
0.6375
0.7371
0.7528
0.7032
0.6234
0.7952
0.6677
0.6417
0.4598
0.7353
0.5032
0.5408
0.5301
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Organizational
fairness

Table A1.1. Polychoric factor analysis with Promax rotation (three factors) (cont.)
Factor Structure
Item

Job
stress

19. Compared to my peers (same rank), I find
that I am likely to be more criticized for
my mistakes
20. I feel that I am less likely to get chosen for
certain assignments because of “who I
am” (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation,
physical characteristics)
21. Within the department, gender related
jokes are often made in my presence
22. When I am assertive or question the way
things are done, I am considered militant
23. Promotions in this department are tied to
ability and merit
24. The administration supports officers who
are in trouble
25. The department tends to be more lenient
in enforcing rules and regulations for
female officers
26. Female officers are held to a higher
standard than male officers

Job
contentment

Organizational
fairness

0.5745

0.5123

0.5148
0.5562
0.5260
-.5089
.4452

27. I feel burned out from my job

.5996

28. I feel like I am at the end of my rope

.5297

29. I feel I treat the public as if they were
impersonal objects

.4663

Eigenvalue

10.70

1.99

1.34

Percentage of variance (%)

61%

11%

8%

Note. N = 982, Factor loadings < 0.4 are not shown.
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Table A1.2. Differences in the treatment levels before and after weighting on the propensity score
Before weighting
Standard Mean
Difference
Covariates

Some
College

After weighting

Variance Ratio

Bachelor’s
Degree

Some
College

Standard Mean
Difference

Bachelor’s
Degree

Some
College

Bachelor’s
Degree

Variance Ratio

Some
College

Bachelor’s
Degree

Tenure
0.12 (33)

0.13 (33)

0.93 (0)

0.95 (0)

0.00 (2)

-0.05 (2)

0.94 (0)

1.00 (0)

0.26 (33)

-0.02 (33)

0.90 (0)

0.98 (0)

0.00 (2)

-0.01 (2)

0.77 (0)

0.98 (0)

0.22 (33)

0.18 (33)

1.37 (0)

1.09 (0)

0.01 (2)

0.01 (2)

1.01 (0)

0.97 (0)

Citizen
Contact

0.27 (33)

0.43 (33)

1.01 (0)

0.93 (0)

0.01 (2)

-0.02 (2)

0.84 (0)

0.93 (0)

Veteran
Status

-0.02 (0)

-0.03 (0)

0.98 (0)

1.02 (0)

-0.05 (2)

0.02 (2)

0.98 (0)

0.97 (0)

-0.05 (0)

0.72 (33)

1.11 (0)

1.78 (0)

-0.03 (2)

0.02 (2)

1.05 (0)

1.03 (0)

0.17 (0)

0.13 (0)

0.91 (0)

0.94 (0)

-0.01 (2)

-0.01 (2)

1.01(0)

1.01 (0)

0.13 (0)

-0.02 (0)

0.95 (0)

0.98 (0)

0.00 (2)

0.02 (2)

1.00 (0)

1.25 (0)

Job
Contentment

0.21 (19)

-0.05 (6)

1.02 (0)

1.11 (0)

0.01 (2)

-0.03 (2)

0.96 (0)

1.05 (0)

Observations

1,104

1,104

Age

High Ranked

Married

Male

investigated

Mean values

0.16

0.22

1,104

1.00

1,104

1,104

1.11

0.02

1,104

-0.02

1,104

0.95

1,104

1.00

Note: The number of imputed data sets out of 35 with SMD and VR statistics exceeding the recommended thresholds in parentheses

115

Appendix B
Table 2.1. Imputed descriptive statistics for study variables (N = 1,023)
Variable

M/Percent

SD

Range

Percent imputed

23.48

104.71

0-2,941.18

0.72

4.69

14.18

0-333.33

26.37

28.18

106.21

0-2,941.18

29.88

Dependent Variables
Abuse of authority complaints
Excessive force complaints
Total misconduct complaints
Focal Variable
College degree saturation

26.01

Low

0.32

0.02

-

-

Medium

0.35

0.02

-

-

High

0.33

0.02

-

-

Percent female

0.07

.60

0-0.46

17.10

Percent non-white

0.11

0.14

0-0.99

18.09

10.32

3.65

1-37

27.63

Mean age (logged)

3.58

0.12

3.18-4.09

27.54

Department size (logged)

4.48

1.48

0-10.19

0.00

548.84

240.90

0-3,200

19.26

Crisis intervention training

-0.00

0.95

-2.13-1.98

26.46

Use of force training

-0.01

0.93

-3.40-1.04

26.46

Internal affairs unit

0.46

0.02

0-1

1.44

Public dispositions

0.21

0.01

0-1

0.81

Citizen review

0.08

0.01

0-1

0.45

Department Composition

Mean years of service

Police Training
Academy hours

Bureaucratic Controls
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Table 2.1. Imputed descriptive statistics for study variables (cont.)
Reporting standards

1.33

0.40

-0.00

0.28

Large population

0.68

0.01

0-1

0.00

City agency

0.66

0.01

0-1

0.00

Mean Part I arrests

8.21

8.95

0-96.57

29.34

Mean Part II arrests

23.08

24.22

0-270.80

30.42

Transparency

0-2
-0.88-1.48

1.08
0.09

Jurisdiction Controls
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Table 2.2. Effects of Department Education Level on Police Misconduct Complaintsab
Panel A
(unweighted)
Abuse of Authority

Excessive Force

Total Misconduct

(N = 1,023)

(N = 1,023)

(N = 1,023)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Education level

Medium level

9.88 (0.10)**

9.74, 10.02

0.54 (0.11)

0.43, 0.64

9.58 (0.08)**

9.33, 9.82

High level

7.16 (0.10)**

6.52, 7.80

-0.39 (0.12)

-0.22, -0.57

6.50 (0.09)*

6.33, 6.67

Panel B
(weighted)
Abuse of Authority

Excessive Force

Total Misconduct

(N = 1,023)

(N = 1,023)

(N = 1,023)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Medium level

25.48 (35.68)

-44.45, 95.41

-5.13 (13.30)

High level

-6.53 (19.99)

-45.72, 32.66

-6.13 (13.24)

b

95% CI

-31.21, 20.94

22.00 (35.39)

-47.36, 91.37

-32.09, 19.83

-11.21 (20.25)

-50.91, 28.49

Education level

Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01 ***p < .001
aRobust standard errors in parentheses.
breference category = Low education level
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Table 2.3. Effects of Department Education Level on Police Misconduct Complaints (over 50,000 residents) ab
Panel A
(unweighted)
Abuse of Authority

Excessive Force

Total Misconduct

(N = 751)

(N = 751)

(N = 751)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Education
level
Medium level

7.14 (0.09)***

7.03,
7.25

0.39 (0.14)

0.07, 0.71

7.80 (0.08)***

7.55, 8.04

High level

9.58 (0.09)***

9.49,
9.66

0.29 (0.16)

0.01, 0.58

10.14 (0.08)***

9.93, 10.35

Panel B
(weighted)
Abuse of Authority

Excessive Force

Total Misconduct

(N = 751)

(N = 751)

(N = 751)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

7.54 (4.29)

-0.87, 15.95

0.51 (1.31)

-2.07,
3.09

8.19 (4.65)

-0.94, 17.31

11.72 (7.33)

-2.65, 26.09

0.71 (1.76)

-2.74,
4.16

12.27 (6.40)*

-0.29, 24.82

Education
level
Medium level

High level

Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01 ***p < .001
aRobust standard errors in parentheses.
breference category = Low education levels
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Figure B2.1. Scree plot showing eigen values by factors
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Table B2.1. Principal axis factor analysis with promax rotation (two factors)
Factor Structure
Item

Crisis intervention
training

Use of force
training

30. Non-lethal use of force in-service training

.8910

31. Use of deadly force in-service training

.9227

32. Use of non-lethal weapons in-service training

.7515

33. Firearm qualification in-service training

.6529

34. Crisis intervention skills in-service training

.5386

35. Suicide prevention in-service training

.5694

36. Victim assistance in-service training

.7521

37. Domestic violence in-service training

.7993

Eigenvalue

9.43

1.79

Percentage of variance (%)

77%

15%
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Table B2.2. Differences in the treatment levels before and after weighting on the propensity scorea
Before weighting

Standard Mean
Difference

Covariates

After weighting

Variance Ratio

Medium
Education

Standard Mean
Difference

High
Education

Medium
Education

Variance Ratio

Medium
Education

High
Education

High
Education

Medium
Education

High
Education

0.25 (56)

0.31 (56)

0.76 (0)

0.76 (0)

0.13 (0)

-0.01 (2)

0.86 (0)

0.84 (0)

0.05 (46)

0.16 (66)

0.64 (0)

0.68 (0)

0.23 (14)

0.06 (7)

0.86 (0)

0.85 (0)

0.20 (14)

0.44 (55)

0.75 (0)

0.97 (0)

0.18 (40)

-0.04 (9)

0.98 (0)

0.86 (0)

0.16 (0)

0.21 (56)

0.66 (0)

0.61 (0)

-0.01 (0)

-0.01 (12)

0.77 (0)

0.73 (0)

0.25 (14)

0.38 (35)

0.87 (0)

0.86 (0)

-0.02 (2)

-0.02 (0)

0.88 (0)

0.83 (0)

0.52 (46)

0.88 (56)

1.22 (0)

1.08 (0)

-0.11 (0)

0.06 (6)

0.76 (0)

0.67 (0)

0.37 (31)

0.39 (106)

0.82 (0)

0.73 (0)

0.18 (23)

0.05 (0)

0.88 (0)

0.93 (0)

Mean years
of service

Mean age

Mean years
of service x
mean age

Academy
hours
Crisis
intervention
training

Reporting
standards
City agency

Observations

Mean values

1,023

0.26

1,023

0.40

1,023

0.82

1,023

0.81

1,023

0.13

1,023

0.05

1,023

1,023

0.86

Note: The number of imputed data sets out of 144 with SMD and VR statistics exceeding the recommended thresholds in parentheses.
areference category = Low education level
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Appendix C
Table 3.1. Imputed descriptive statistics for study variables (N = 1,543)
Variable

M/Percent

SD

Range

Dependent Variables
Homicide rate

3.96

10.06

0-202.12

Robbery rate

82.42

116.16

0-988.50

Aggravated assault
rate

218.67

250.37

0-2,599.94

Burglary rate

555.31

516.79

0-6,036.04

2,074.16

1,596.10

179.91

211.46

Theft rate
Motor vehicle theft
rate

0-15,688.95
0-2,083.33

Focal Variable
Education minimum

.17

0-1

High violent crime
arrest rate

.54

0-1

High property crime
arrest rate

.52

0-1

Mediators

Covariates
Percent nonwhite
officers

0.15

0.19

Percent female
officers

.09

.07

Police strength

225.19

138.84

Administrative
density

50.57

50.38

Investigative capacity

.15

1.00

0-100

Patrol capacity

.71

.16

0.100
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0-1

0-0.50

12.96-2,551.02
0-569.80

Table 3.1. Imputed descriptive statistics for study variables (continued)
Fiscal capacity

266.17

190.16

.45

.31

9.84

1.62

5.28-15.17

Percent nonwhite

.24

.20

0.10-99.83

Percent immigrant
residents

.11

.11

0-0.73

Residential stability

.38

.14

0.01-0.83

Educational
attainment

.05

.04

0-0.52

-.03

.95

Community-oriented
activity
Population (logged)

Economic
disadvantage
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15.16-4,057.27
0-1

-2.43-3.76

Table 3.2. Direct, indirect, and total effects of agency education requirements on violent crime a
Homicide

Robbery

Aggravated Assault

(N = 1,543)

(N = 1,543)

(N = 1,543)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

-0.30 (0.29)

-0.85, 0.24

2.81 (4.11)

-5.24, 10.85

-21.83 (8.39)**

-38.27, -5.39

DE

-0.17 (0.30)

-0.75, 0.42

3.69 (4.00)

-4.14, 11.52

-18.54 (8.45)*

-35.11, -1.97

IDE

-0.14 (0.13)

-0.38, 0.11

-0.89 (1.58)

-3.97, 2.20

-3.29 (3.74)

-10.63, 4.05

ATT

Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01 ***p < .001; ATT = Average treatment effect on the treated; DE = direct effect; IDE = indirect effect
aRobust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.3. Direct, indirect, and total effects of agency education requirements on property crime a
Burglary

Theft

Motor Vehicle Theft

(N = 1,543)

(N = 1,543)

(N = 1,543)

b

95% CI

ATT

-46.39 (17.95)**

-81.57, -11.20

DE

-33.37 (23.71)

IDE

-13.01 (16.90)

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

80.58 (70.74)

-58.07, 219.23

-11.70 (10.78)

-32.83, 9.44

-79.85, 13.10

94.91 (73.79)

-49.71, 239.52

-20.66 (14.06)

-48.22, 6.90

-46.13, 20.11

-14.33 (38.69)

-90.17, 61.51

8.96 (9.20)

-9.07, 26.99

Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01 ***p < .001; ATT = Average treatment effect on the treated; DE = direct effect; IDE = indirect effect
standard errors in parentheses.

aRobust
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Figure C3.1. Scree plot showing eigen values by factors
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Table C3.1. Mean differences between comparison groups pre and post entropy balancing
Covariates

Before weighting

After weighting

-2.73

0

2.31

0

Police strength

-43.70

0

Fiscal capacity

17.20

0

Community-oriented activity

0.11

0

Population (logged)

0.86

0

-0.41

0

Percent non-white officers
Percent female officers

Educational attainment
(N = 1,543)
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